Verdad a través de los contextos. Funcionalismo, pragmatismo y expresiones veritativas
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Abstract
This text presents a functionalist analysis of truth-expressions. In the first section, Ezcurdia’s functionalism is interpreted as a pragmatist position. The second section analyzes the function of truth ascriptions and the specific contribution of truth-expressions to them. These expressions enable truth ascriptions to serve as tools for asserting propositions and expressing certain features of the ongoing speech act. In the third section, it is argued that, because of their nature, truth ascriptions can express different contents in different contexts while maintaining a constant role across them.
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