Is Language Necessary for Acquiring Conceptual Capabilities?
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Abstract
Normative conceptual holists have argued that conceptual capabilities can only be acquired through language. The a priori nature of their argument means that, if it is correct, not only is it a mistake for scientists to attribute conceptual capabilities to nonlinguistic animals, but also a mistake to think that empirical results have any bearing on such a claim. I argue that the absurd conclusion that concept acquisition is impossible can be derived from the claims that motivate this argument. Normative conceptual holists can avoid this result, but only by giving up the claim that linguistic and conceptual capabilities are necessarily linked. It follows that it is an open and empirical question whether nonlinguistic animals have conceptual capabilities.
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