Conceptualismo y realismo ingenuo. La propuesta de Daniel Kalpokas

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Ignacio Ávila Cañamares
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0984-3285

Abstract

In this paper I examine some aspects of Daniel Kalpokas’s philosophical view on perception. I begin by drawing a contrast between Kalpokas’s and the naïve realists’s understanding of the epistemic role of perception in our judgements and beliefs. I then argue that there is a significant tension between Kalpokas’s critique of naïve realism and his own conciliatory proposal. I further claim that this proposal ultimately falls into a form of naïve realism regarding perceptual justification. I conclude with a brief phenomenological discussion.

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How to Cite
Ávila Cañamares, I. (2026). Conceptualismo y realismo ingenuo. La propuesta de Daniel Kalpokas. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 58(173), 65–76. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1811

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References

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