La teoría proposicional y la percepción como logro cognitivo
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Abstract
Kalpokas argues that our perceptual experiences possess a unique kind of propositional content—conceptual and world-dependent—capable of justifying beliefs without falling into the myth of the given. I will discuss three constitutive theses of his theory. First, that conscious reference to objects is always conceptual and requires the representation of states of affairs. Second, that amodal completeness is also conceptual and requires background knowledge. Third, that concepts penetrate experiences and their contents. I will present exegetical, theoretical, and empirical considerations aimed at questioning and limiting the scope of these theses, and I will suggest that Kalpokas makes a precipitous shift from an epistemological proposal to a metaphysical one concerning the kinds of contents admissible in our experiences.
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