Conocer y saber

Abstract

There are two verbs in Spanish used with different meaning although both would be translated into English as “know”. They are “conocer” and “saber”. This same distinction occurs in other languages, for example in French: “connaître” and “savoir”, and in German: “kennen” and “wissen”. This semantical distinction can help us to discover a similar distinction of epistemological interest. Since these verbs cannot be translated into English with two different words, we will refer to them here as know1 (conocer) and know2 (saber).
The direct object of “know1” is always either a noun or a personal pronoun, whereas that of “know2” may be either an independent clause or a verb in infinitive. We know1 objects or persons and we know2 that some objects have certain properties or we know2 how to perform certain activities.
Knowing1 an object implies knowing2 that that object has such and such a property; however, knowing2 that an object has such and such a property does not imply knowing1 the object in question. Thus, to know1 x is something more than just being able to ascribe certain properties to x. In order to know1 something it is a necessary condition to have a personal experience of the object or to have had it, i.e., to have been acquainted with it. One can be acquainted not only with empirical facts but also with cultural ones. The object of knowledge1 therefore can be not only an empirical object but also a set of meaningful statements. Hence, the direct experience implied in knowing1 must be understood in such a broad sense as to embrace any sort of direct apprehension of all kind of facts, physical as well as mental.
However it is not the case that all direct experience is a species of knowing1. Sensing is not a kind of knowing1. It does not make sense to say that I know a noise or a color or a taste (except in the case of using “knowing” as “recognizing”). Knowing1 something is not the same as having just a series of sense data of an object; it presupposes the integration of those sense data into the unity of an object. In its strong sense, “knowing1 x” also presupposes to have a general picture or idea of the object, to know how it is and not only how does it appears to the immediate apprehension. One of the possible basis for the distinction between “being” and “appearing”, characteristic of many philosophical systems, could be found perhaps in the difference in use of the verbs “knowing1” on the one hand, and “seeing”, “hearing”, and “feeling” on the other. One feels, sees or hears sense data, i.e., ways of appearing of the object. One knows1 the object as a unity which appears in different ways.
In a broader sense, knowing1 implies being able to answer various questions concerning the object one knows. Consider, for example, statements such as: “I know animals”, “I know Hegel”, “I know women”. In these statements there is a presupposition that the speaker must be a good source of information concerning that field of his knowledge. Knowing in this sense consists of being able to integrate into a unity any experience and any partial knowledge of an object.
It is also possible to distinguish between “knowing1” and “knowing2 how”. The former refers always to an object or to a person denoted by a noun or a personal pronoun; the latter refers to an action which can be denoted by a verb. However, there are some coincidences between “knowing1” and “knowing2 how”. Both of them refer to a specific capability or skill. “Knowing1 x” implies: “knowing2 how to answer different questions concerning x”, “knowing2 how to relate the different aspects of x in a unity”, “knowing2 how x behaves”, and so on. It presupposes, more generally being able to give adequate intellectual answers to any question concerning x. On many occasions, when we use “knowing1 x” is also a convenient antecedent (although not a necessary condition) for the truth of “knowing2 how to deal with x, “knowing2 how to manage it”, “knowing2 how to act properly on x”. From the fact that A knows1 x one cannot infer that A necessarily knows2 how to deal with x or how to behave in front of x, one can only assume that there is a high probability of his being able to do so. This assumption will be stronger if A is supposed to realize a theoretical or intellectual task.
Another important difference between “knowing1” and “knowing2” appears when we pay attention to the different meaning of the questions: “How do you know1?” and “How do you know2?” An accurate answer to the question “How do you know2?” would be to show the reasons on which our knowledge is grounded. On the other hand, the only proper way to answer to the question “How do you know1?” would be to show the manner or procedure through which we have come to acquire our knowledge; this would be quite different from giving the grounds for our knowledge. In this respect “knowing1” is more like other verbs which refer to the different ways in which we can acquire a knowledge, such as “proving”, “deducing”, “inferring”, “concluding”, than to the verbs “knowing2” or “believing”.
If we take “reasons” to mean the grounds from which I can logically deduce a proposition, we can say that knowing1 does not imply having reasons of my knowledge1. I can answer the question “Do you know1 x?” “I actually do know1 it”, but I cannot answer why I know it (in the sense of giving the reasons why I know1 it). The latter would not make any sense. However, it would certainly make sense to demand that a claim to know1 be justified before everybody. But in contrast with knowing2, a knowledge1 is not justified with reasons. If someone questions my claim to know1 x, I can justify it in different ways: 1) mentioning the circumstances, occasions, procedure or manner through which I acquired my knowledge1 of x; 2) answering questions about x in the proper way; 3) behaving in front of x in a way which shows that I am familiar with it, that I know how to deal with it.
The justifications of my knowledge1 can be used by other people as the reasons on which their beliefs or their knowledge2 of my knowledge1 can be grounded. Those justifications cannot work as the reasons for someone else’s knowing1, but for his knowing2 or his believing. Thus the relationship between justification and transmission of a knowledge is not the same when it is a knowledge1 than when it is a knowledge2. Giving a justification of knowledge2 is the same as transmitting it. In order to transmit my knowledge2 it would be sufficient to show the reasons or evidence on which it is based. That is why knowing2 can be seen as a transitive relation.
On the contrary, justifying a knowledge1 does not imply its transmission. If someone, say A, justifies before B his knowledge1 of x, B can know2 that A knows1 x, that is to say, B has sufficient reasons to assert that A knows1 x, but he does not share A’s knowledge1. B does not know1 what A knows1. In order for B to know1 what A knows1 it would be necessary that he had at least some experiences similar to those that A has with the object of his knowledge1.
One cannot give reasons of one’s knowing1, but knowing1 can be a sufficient reason for knowing2. In order to justify one’s knowing2 that p, one can give three kinds of reasons: (1) Another knowing2 that… (“How do you know2 that p?” — “Because it follows from q and I know2 that q.”) (2) The immediate sense experience. (“How do you know2 that the sofa is red?” — “Because I have seen it.”) (3) A knowledge1 which has been previously justified. (“How do you know2 that Pablo is a responsible man?” — “Because I know1 him.”) (A knowledge1 can be used as sufficient reason to justify a knowledge2 if the former can be properly justified. But it is often hard, and sometimes impossible, to give a universally acceptable justification of my knowledge1. Since it is not directly transmissible, it can only be proved indirectly showing its antecedents or its consequences. Those beliefs grounded on knowledges1 which cannot be universally proved cannot reach the category of knowledges2. However, many beliefs which are based on deep personal knowledges1 about men and life, and of which one cannot give any justification acceptable to anyone, often constitute more permanent and solid convictions than any other knowledge2. These convictions can only be shared by those who are capable of acquiring for themselves a knowledge1 similar to that which serves as their basis. Moral, religious and artistic convictions are mostly of this kind. That is the reason why the way they are transmitted and justified is different from that in which a scientific knowledge is transmitted and justified.
In short, there are some necessary conditions in order to know1 x:
(1) To have, or have had, some direct experiences of x (hence, the existence of x seems to be also a necessary condition for knowing1 x).
(2) To be able to integrate into the unity of an object x different experiences of x.
(3) To be able to give certain adequate intellectual answers to different questions concerning x.
However, neither being able to give sufficient reasons of x (as it is the case with knowing2 that …), nor being able to behave adequately with respect to x (as it is the case with knowing2 how…) are necessary conditions for knowing1 x.
The criteria that can be used to justify to anyone the two kinds of knowledge that have been distinguished in this paper are equally different. Knowing2 is justified by adducing reasons while knowing1 can be justified by showing its antecedents or consequences. It would be out of place to seriously demand the kind of justification proper to knowing1 for a knowing2 and viceversa.