The Standard Story of Action and the Problem of Agential Guidance
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El problema de la agencia guiada consiste en explicar la posibilidad de guiar una acción puramente en términos reduccionistas causales. Después de examinar la articulación que Harry Frankfurt ofrece de este problema, la respuesta causal comúnmente aceptada es explorada y cuestionada. Dos desafíos explicativos generales se identifican como decisivos para evaluar la viabilidad de una respuesta causal al problema de la agencia guiada: primero, el poder identificar correctamente las fuentes detrás de las acciones guiadas a través de intenciones guías, y, segundo, el reconocimiento de los límites de una estrategia basada en el contenido como el modo de identificar una acción que es guiada.
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Aguilar, J. H. (2020). The Standard Story of Action and the Problem of Agential Guidance. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(155), 3–25. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1192
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Aguilar, J. and A. Buckareff (eds.), 2010, Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Anscombe, G.E.M, 1963, Intention, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bishop, J., 2012, “Exercising Control in Practical Reasoning: Problems for Naturalism about Agency”, Philosophical Issues, vol. 22, pp. 53–72.
Bishop, J., 2010, “Scepticism about Natural Agency and the Causal Theory of Action”, in J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 69–83.
Bishop, J., 1997, “Naturalising Mental Action”, in G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, Volume 1: Individual Action, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 251–266.
Bishop, J., 1989, Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Brand, M., 1984, Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Bratman, M., 1987, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Chisholm, R., 1966, “Freedom and Action”, in K. Leher (ed.), Freedom and Determinism, Random House, New York, pp. 11–44.
Davies, M., 1983, “Function in Perception”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 158–162.
Della Sala, S., C. Marchetti, and H. Spinnler, 1991, “Right-Sided Anarchic (Alien) Hand: a Longitudinal Study”, Neuropsychologia, vol. 29, no. 11, pp. 1113-1127.
Di Nucci, E., 2011, “Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a New Anti-Causalist Dawn”, Philosophical Explorations, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 117–131.
Enç, B., 2003, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Frankfurt, H., 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in F.D. Schoeman (ed.) Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 27–45.
Frankfurt, H., 1978, “The Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 157–162.
Frankfurt, H., 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, pp. 5–20.
Ginet, C., 1990, On Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hornsby, J., 2004, “Agency and Actions”, in J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds.), Agency and Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–24.
Humphreys, G.W. and M.J. Riddoch, 2003, “Fractionating the Intentional Control of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Analysis”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 201–217.
Jeannerod, M., 2006, Motor Cognition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Jeannerod, M., 1997, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action, Blackwell, Oxford.
Kim, J., 2010, Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lewis, D., 1980, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 239–249.
Marcel, A., 2003, “The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 48–93.
McDowell, J., 2011, “Some Remarks on Intention in Action”, The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, vol. 6, pp. 1–18.
Melden, A.I., 1961, Free Action, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Mele, A., 2003, Motivation and Agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mele, A., 1997, The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mele, A., 1992, The Springs of Action, Oxford University Press, New York.
Mylopoulos, M. and E. Pacherie, 2019, “Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited”, WIREs Cognitive Science, vol. 10, no. 2, e1481.
Mylopoulos, M. and E. Pacherie, 2017, “Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 317–336.
O’Shaughnessy, B., 1991, “Searle’s Theory of Action”, in E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 271–288.
O’Shaughnessy, B., 1973, “Trying (As the Mental ‘Pineal Gland’)”, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 13, pp. 365–386.
Pacherie, E., 2011, “Non-Conceptual Representation for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control”, Social Psychology, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 67–73.
Pacherie, E., 2008, “The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework”,
Cognition, vol. 107, no. 1, pp. 179–217.
Pacherie, E., 2000, “The Content of Intentions”, Mind and Language, vol. 15,
no. 4, pp. 400–432.
Peacock, C., 1979, “Deviant Causal Chains”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 123–155.
Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Shepherd, J., 2019, “Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 286–305.
Shepherd, J., 2018, “Intelligent Action Guidance and the Use of Mixed Representational
Formats”, Synthese. (doi.org/10.1007/s11229–018–1892–7).
Shepherd, J., 2017, “The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 114, no. 8, pp. 422–448.
Smith, M., 2012, “Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies)”, Philosophical Issues, vol. 22, pp. 387–401.
Thalberg, I., 1984, “Do Our Intentions Cause Our Intentional Actions?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 249–260.
Velleman, J.D., 1992, “What Happens When Someone Acts?”, Mind, vol. 101, no. 403, pp. 461–481.
Aguilar, J. and A. Buckareff (eds.), 2010, Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Anscombe, G.E.M, 1963, Intention, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bishop, J., 2012, “Exercising Control in Practical Reasoning: Problems for Naturalism about Agency”, Philosophical Issues, vol. 22, pp. 53–72.
Bishop, J., 2010, “Scepticism about Natural Agency and the Causal Theory of Action”, in J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 69–83.
Bishop, J., 1997, “Naturalising Mental Action”, in G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, Volume 1: Individual Action, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 251–266.
Bishop, J., 1989, Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Brand, M., 1984, Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Bratman, M., 1987, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Chisholm, R., 1966, “Freedom and Action”, in K. Leher (ed.), Freedom and Determinism, Random House, New York, pp. 11–44.
Davies, M., 1983, “Function in Perception”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 158–162.
Della Sala, S., C. Marchetti, and H. Spinnler, 1991, “Right-Sided Anarchic (Alien) Hand: a Longitudinal Study”, Neuropsychologia, vol. 29, no. 11, pp. 1113-1127.
Di Nucci, E., 2011, “Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a New Anti-Causalist Dawn”, Philosophical Explorations, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 117–131.
Enç, B., 2003, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Frankfurt, H., 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in F.D. Schoeman (ed.) Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 27–45.
Frankfurt, H., 1978, “The Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 157–162.
Frankfurt, H., 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, pp. 5–20.
Ginet, C., 1990, On Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hornsby, J., 2004, “Agency and Actions”, in J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds.), Agency and Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–24.
Humphreys, G.W. and M.J. Riddoch, 2003, “Fractionating the Intentional Control of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Analysis”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 201–217.
Jeannerod, M., 2006, Motor Cognition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Jeannerod, M., 1997, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action, Blackwell, Oxford.
Kim, J., 2010, Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lewis, D., 1980, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 239–249.
Marcel, A., 2003, “The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 48–93.
McDowell, J., 2011, “Some Remarks on Intention in Action”, The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, vol. 6, pp. 1–18.
Melden, A.I., 1961, Free Action, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Mele, A., 2003, Motivation and Agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mele, A., 1997, The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mele, A., 1992, The Springs of Action, Oxford University Press, New York.
Mylopoulos, M. and E. Pacherie, 2019, “Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited”, WIREs Cognitive Science, vol. 10, no. 2, e1481.
Mylopoulos, M. and E. Pacherie, 2017, “Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 317–336.
O’Shaughnessy, B., 1991, “Searle’s Theory of Action”, in E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 271–288.
O’Shaughnessy, B., 1973, “Trying (As the Mental ‘Pineal Gland’)”, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 13, pp. 365–386.
Pacherie, E., 2011, “Non-Conceptual Representation for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control”, Social Psychology, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 67–73.
Pacherie, E., 2008, “The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework”,
Cognition, vol. 107, no. 1, pp. 179–217.
Pacherie, E., 2000, “The Content of Intentions”, Mind and Language, vol. 15,
no. 4, pp. 400–432.
Peacock, C., 1979, “Deviant Causal Chains”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 123–155.
Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Shepherd, J., 2019, “Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 286–305.
Shepherd, J., 2018, “Intelligent Action Guidance and the Use of Mixed Representational
Formats”, Synthese. (doi.org/10.1007/s11229–018–1892–7).
Shepherd, J., 2017, “The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 114, no. 8, pp. 422–448.
Smith, M., 2012, “Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies)”, Philosophical Issues, vol. 22, pp. 387–401.
Thalberg, I., 1984, “Do Our Intentions Cause Our Intentional Actions?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 249–260.
Velleman, J.D., 1992, “What Happens When Someone Acts?”, Mind, vol. 101, no. 403, pp. 461–481.
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