¿Saber sin verdad? Objeciones a un argumento de Villoro
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Abstract
One of the main arguments of Creer, saber, conocer against the inclusion of the notion of truth in the definition of knowledge is examined. It is claimed that the argument fails, among other reasons, because it grants the sceptic a false premise about the conditions of applicability of the verb "to know".
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Hurtado, G. (2003). ¿Saber sin verdad? Objeciones a un argumento de Villoro. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 35(103), 121–134. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2003.1010
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Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License.
Creado a partir de la obra en http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica.