La naturaleza del sujeto y el argumento de la unidad
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Abstract
In the present work I inspect several answers to the question raised by Descartes What Am I? I suggest that, although the proposal that I am identical to my human organism or to some part of it (the thesis embraced by materialists) is thought to be the most plausible in nowadays scientific viewpoint, it faces a problem that seems intractable, namely: the problem of accounting the identity-dependence between mental states and their subjects. Finally, I contend that the genuine bearers of mental states are, in the broad sense of the term, unitary subjects of experience, rather than persons.
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Sampedro, A. (2019). La naturaleza del sujeto y el argumento de la unidad. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 51(152), 85–111. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.10
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References
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Baker, L.R., 2012, “Personal Identity: A Not So-Simple Simple View”, en G. Gasser y M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York, pp. 179–191.
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Locke, J., [1689] 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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Lowe, E.J., 1996, Subjects of Experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Madden, R., 2016, “Human Persistence”, Philosophers’ Imprint, vol. 16, no. 17, pp. 1–18.
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Moreland, J.P., 2003, “An Argument for Animalism”, en R. Martin y J. Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 318–334.
Pascalev, A., M. Pascalev y J. Giordano, 2016, “Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics”, Neuroethics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 15–22.
Schaffer, J., 2001, “The Individuation of Tropes”, Autralasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 247–257.
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Snowdon, P.F., 2014, Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Strawson, P.F., 1959, Individuals, Methuen, Londres.
Van Gulick, R., 2018, “Consciousness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/consciousness/ [Fecha de consulta: 16/04/2019].
Van Inwagen, P., 2007, “A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person”, en P. van Inwagen y D.W. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons. Human and Divine, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, pp. 199–215.
Van Inwagen, P., 1981, “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 62, pp. 123–137.
Baker, L.R., 2012, “Personal Identity: A Not So-Simple Simple View”, en G. Gasser y M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York, pp. 179–191.
Baker, L.R., 2005, “When Does a Person Begin?”, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 25–48.
Baker, L.R., 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Blatti, S., 2012, “A New Argument for Animalism”, Analysis, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 685–690.
Ehring, D., 2011, Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Elsharkawy, A.E., H. Pannek y F. Oppel., 2008, “Hemispherectomy”, Pan Arab Journal of Neurosurgery, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 11–18.
Fine, K., 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 8, pp. 1–16.
Guillot, M., 2017, “I, Me, Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 23–53.
Lamba, N., D. Holsgrove y M.L. Broekman, 2016, “The History of Head Transplantation: A Review”, Acta Neurochir, vol. 158, no. 12, pp. 2239– 2247.
Locke, J., [1689] 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Lowe, E.J., 2014, “Why My Body is Not Me: The Unity Argument for Emergent Self-Body Dualism”, en A. Lavazza y H. Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense, Routledge, Nueva York, pp. 245– 265.
Lowe, E.J., 2012a, “Asymmetrical Dependence in Individuation”, en F. Correia y B. Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York, pp. 214– 233.
Lowe, E.J., 2012b, “The Probable Simplicity of Personal Identity”, en G. Gasser y M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York, pp. 137–155.
Lowe, E.J., 2009a, More Kinds of Being: A further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Lowe, E.J., 2009b, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism”, en B.P. Göcke (ed.), After Physicalism, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp. 48–71.
Lowe, E.J., 2003, “Individuation”, en M.J. Loux y D.W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, pp. 75–95.
Lowe, E.J., 1996, Subjects of Experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Madden, R., 2016, “Human Persistence”, Philosophers’ Imprint, vol. 16, no. 17, pp. 1–18.
Mertz, D.W., 2001, “Individuation and Instance Ontology”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 45–61.
Moreland, J.P., 1998, “Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 251–263. Olson, E.T. 2007, What Are We? A Study on Personal Identity, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Moreland, J.P., 2003, “An Argument for Animalism”, en R. Martin y J. Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 318–334.
Pascalev, A., M. Pascalev y J. Giordano, 2016, “Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics”, Neuroethics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 15–22.
Schaffer, J., 2001, “The Individuation of Tropes”, Autralasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 247–257.
Smith, J., 2017, “Self-Consciousness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-con- sciousness/ [Fecha de consulta: 16/04/2019].
Snowdon, P.F., 2014, Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Strawson, P.F., 1959, Individuals, Methuen, Londres.
Van Gulick, R., 2018, “Consciousness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/consciousness/ [Fecha de consulta: 16/04/2019].
Van Inwagen, P., 2007, “A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person”, en P. van Inwagen y D.W. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons. Human and Divine, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, pp. 199–215.
Van Inwagen, P., 1981, “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 62, pp. 123–137.
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