A Lemma from Nowhere

Contenido principal del artículo

Imogen Dickie

Resumen

Este artículo usa casos que involucran términos singulares vacíos (por una parte, casos de lo que llamo “acercaidad-fallida accidental”; por otra parte, casos que involucran nombres propios que aparecen en ficción) para argumentar a favor de una postura acerca de la meta de la actividad ordinaria de formar creencias, y muestra cómo esta postura genera nuevos fundamentos para la teoría de la referencia.

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Dickie, I. (2020). A Lemma from Nowhere. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(154), 11–47. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1173

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