Nonexistence and Aboutness: The Bandersnatches of Dubuque
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Resumen
Holmes existe es falsa. ¿Cómo puede ser, cuando no hay nadie acerca de quien puede ser la oración? Parte de la respuesta es que el tema de la oración depende del contexto. Así como El rey de Francia es calvo, normalmente imposible de ser evaluada, es falsa qua descripción de la gente calva, Holmes existe es falsa qua descripción de las cosas que existen; describe mal esas cosas como si Holmes estuviera entre ellas. Esto no explica, sin embargo, cómo Holmes no existe difiere en valor cognitivo de, digamos, Vulcano no existe. Nuestra respuesta se construye a partir de una observación de Kripke: aun cuando Holmes exista, no está en este cuarto, porque todos nacimos demasiado tarde.
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Yablo, S. (2020). Nonexistence and Aboutness: The Bandersnatches of Dubuque. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(154), 77–100. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1175
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Khoo, J., 2016, “Probabilities of Conditionals in Context”, Linguistics and Philosophy, pp. 1–43.
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Kripke, S., 2011a, “Identity and Necessity”, in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, vol. 1, chapter 1, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 1–26.
Kripke, S., 2011b, “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”, in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, vol. 1, chapter 3, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 52–74.
Kripke, S., 1988, “A Puzzle about Belief”, in N. Salmon and S. Soames 1988, pp. 102–148.
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Yablo, S., 2016, “Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals”, Analytic Philosophy, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 175–213.
Yablo, S., 2006, “Non-Catastrophic Presupposition Failure”, Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 164–190.
Yablo, S., 2002, “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda”, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne 2002, pp. 441–492.
Yalcin, S., 2015, “Epistemic Modality De Re”, Ergo: an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 475–527.
Yalcin, S., 2012, “A Counterexample to Modus Tollens”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1001–1024.
Zimmermann, T.E., 1993, “On the Proper Treatment of Opacity in Certain Verbs”, Natural Language Semantics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 149–179.
Aloni, M. et al., 2001, Quantification under Conceptual Covers, Inst. for Logic, Language and Computation, Amsterdam.
Atlas, J., 1988, “What Are Negative Existence Statements about?”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 373–394.
Crimmins, M., 1989, “Having Ideas and Having the Concept”, Mind & Language, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 280–294.
Felka, K., 2015a, “On the Presuppositions of Number Sentences”, Synthese, vol. 192, no. 5, pp. 1393–1412.
Felka, K., 2015b, Talking about Numbers: Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism, Klostermann, Vittorio.
Forbes, G., 2000, “Objectual Attitudes”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 141–183.
Forbes, G., 1997, “How Much Substitutivity?”, Analysis, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 109–113.
Gendler, T. and J. Hawthorne, 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Glick, E., 2012, “A Modal Approach to Intentional Identity”, Noûs, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 386–399.
Hintikka, J., 1996, “Knowledge Acknowledged: Knowledge of Propositions vs. Knowledge of Objects”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 251–275.
Hintikka, J., 1984, “Are There Nonexistent Objects? Why Not? but Where Are They?”, Synthese, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 451–458.
Hintikka, J., 1970, “Objects of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintances and Public Figures”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67, no. 21, pp. 869–883.
Hintikka, J., 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Hoek, D., 2018, “Conversational Exculpature”, Philosophical Review, vol. 127, no. 2, pp. 151–196.
Holliday, W. and J. Perry, 2014, “Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic”, in Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics, Springer, New York, pp. 591–629.
Jackson, F., 1979, “On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no. 4, pp. 565–589.
Jandri´c, Andrej, 2014, “ ‘The King of France Is Bald’ Reconsidered: A Case against Yablo”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 169, no. 2, pp. 173–181.
Kaplan, D., 1979, “Transworld Heir Lines”, in M. Loux 1979, pp. 88–109.
Kaufmann, S., 2004, “Conditioning against the Grain”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 583–606.
Khoo, J., 2016, “Probabilities of Conditionals in Context”, Linguistics and Philosophy, pp. 1–43.
Kripke, S., 2013, Reference and Existence: The 1973 John Locke Lectures, Oxford University Press, USA.
Kripke, S., 2011a, “Identity and Necessity”, in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, vol. 1, chapter 1, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 1–26.
Kripke, S., 2011b, “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”, in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, vol. 1, chapter 3, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 52–74.
Kripke, S., 1988, “A Puzzle about Belief”, in N. Salmon and S. Soames 1988, pp. 102–148.
Kripke, S. et al., 1973, “Intentionality, Language, and Translation: Second General Discussion Session”, Synthese, vol. 27, no. 3/4, pp. 509–521.
Lasersohn, P., 1993, “Existence Presuppositions and Background Knowledge”, Journal of Semantics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 113–133.
Lewis, D., 1978, “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, pp. 37–46.
Loux, M. (comp.), 1979, The Possible and the Actual, Cornell University Press, USA.
McGee, V., 2000, “To Tell the Truth about Conditionals”, Analysis, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 107–111.
Moltmann, F., 1997, “Intensional Verbs and Quantifiers”, Natural Language Semantics, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–52.
Moss, S., 2018, Probabilistic Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ninan, D., 2018, “Quantification and Epistemic Modality”, Philosophical
Review, vol. 127, no. 4. pp. 433–485.
Noonan, Harold W., 1991, “Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates”, The Philosophical Quarterly (1950–), vol. 41, no. 163, pp. 183–193.
Quine, W.V.O., 1960, Word and Object, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Quine, W.V.O., 1956, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 177–187.
Ramsey, F.P. and D.H. Mellor (comps.), 1990, Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Reimer, M. and A. Bezuidenhout (comps.), 2004, Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Richard, M., 2001, “Seeking a Centaur, Adoring Adonis: Intensional Transitives and Empty Terms”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 103–127.
Rooth, M., 1999, “Association with Focus Or Association with Presupposition?”, Focus: Linguistic, Cognitive, and Computational Perspectives, pp. 232–246.
Santorio, Paolo, 2012, “Reference and Monstrosity”, Philosophical Review, vol. 121, no. 3, pp. 359–406.
Schoubye, S.J., 2009, “Descriptions, Truth Value Intuitions, and Questions”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 583–617.
Salmon, N. and S. Soames (comps.), 1988, Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford University Press, New York.
Stalnaker, R., 1986, “Counterparts and Identity”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 121–140.
Stalnaker, R., 1978, “Assertion”, Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 447–457.
Stalnaker, R., 1977, “Complex Predicates”, The Monist, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 327–339.
Strawson, P., 1964, “Identifying Reference and Truth-Values”, Theoria, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 96–118.
Von Fintel, K., 2004, “Would You Believe It? the King of France Is Back! (Presuppositions and Truth-Value Intuitions)”, in M. Reimer and A. Bezuidenhout 2004, pp. 315–341.
Weatherson, B., 2001, “Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals”, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 203, pp. 200–216.
Yablo, S., 2017, “Symposium on Aboutness”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 174, no. 3, pp. 771–820.
Yablo, S., 2016, “Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals”, Analytic Philosophy, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 175–213.
Yablo, S., 2006, “Non-Catastrophic Presupposition Failure”, Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 164–190.
Yablo, S., 2002, “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda”, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne 2002, pp. 441–492.
Yalcin, S., 2015, “Epistemic Modality De Re”, Ergo: an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 475–527.
Yalcin, S., 2012, “A Counterexample to Modus Tollens”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1001–1024.
Zimmermann, T.E., 1993, “On the Proper Treatment of Opacity in Certain Verbs”, Natural Language Semantics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 149–179.
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