Sometimes Some Things Don’t (Really) Exist: Pragmatic Meinongism and the Referential Sub-Problem of Negative Existentials
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Para resolver el sub-problema referencial de los existenciales negativos, uno debe explicar por que interpretamos usos de, por ejemplo, “Sherlock Holmes no existe” como diciendo algo coherente e intuitivamente verdadero, aunque el hablante intenta referirse a algo. El meinongismo pragmático resuelve este problema al permitir que “no existe” sea pragmáticamente modulado para expresar un sentido inclusivo según el cual puede ser satisfecho por algo. En este trabajo establezco tres puntos en defensa del meinongismo pragmático: (1) es superior a las soluciones inspiradas por Russell, (ii) es apoyado por evidencia independiente de modulación pragmática, y (iii) no requiere compromisos ontológicos dudosos.
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Clapp, L. (2020). Sometimes Some Things Don’t (Really) Exist: Pragmatic Meinongism and the Referential Sub-Problem of Negative Existentials. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(154), 101–127. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1176
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Carston, R., 2002, Thoughts and Utterances: the Pragmatics of Explicit Communication, Blackwell, Oxford.
Clapp, L., forthcoming, “Negative Existentials as Corrections: A Partial Solution to the Problem of Negative Existentials in Segmented Discourse Representation Theory”, Linguistics and Philosophy.
Chalmers, D., 2009, “Ontological Anti-Realism”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman 2009, pp. 77–129.
Chalmers, D., D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds.), 2009, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Everett, A., 2007, “Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 56–80.
Garcia-Carpintero, M. and G. Marti (eds.), 2014, Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Geach, P., 1967, “Intentional Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, no. 20, pp. 627–632.
Kaplan, D., 1989, “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.) 1989, pp. 481–566.
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Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Pietroski, P., 2005, “Meaning Before Truth”, in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Priest, G., 2005, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Clarendon, Oxford.
Quine, W.V.O., 1948, “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics, vol. 2, pp. 21–38.
Recanati, F., 2010, Truth Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Reimer, M., 2001, “A ‘Meinongian’ Solution to a Millian Problem”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 233–248.
Russell, B., 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind, vol. 14, no. 56, pp. 479–493.
Sainsbury, M., 2009, Fiction and Fictionalism, Routledge, London.
Salmon, N., 2014, “What is Existence?”, in M. Garcia-Carpintero and G. Marti (eds.) 2014, pp. 245–261.
Salmon, N., 1998, “Nonexistence”, Noûs, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 277–319.
Schaffer, J., 2009, “On What Grounds What”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.) 2009, pp. 347–383.
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Van Inwagen, P., 1977, “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 299–308.
Von Solodkoff, T., 2014, “Fictional Realism and Negative Existentials”, in M. Garcia-Carpintero and G. Marti (eds.) 2014, pp. 333–352.
Walton, K., 1990, Memesis as Make Believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Yablo, S., 2001, “Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 72–102.
Yablo, S. and A. Gollois, 1998, “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 229–262.
Zalta, E., 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Carston, R., 2019, “Ad Hoc Concepts, Polysemy and the Lexicon”, in K. Scott, B. Clark, and R. Carston (eds.), Relevance, Pragmatics and Interpretation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 150–162.
Carston, R., 2002, Thoughts and Utterances: the Pragmatics of Explicit Communication, Blackwell, Oxford.
Clapp, L., forthcoming, “Negative Existentials as Corrections: A Partial Solution to the Problem of Negative Existentials in Segmented Discourse Representation Theory”, Linguistics and Philosophy.
Chalmers, D., 2009, “Ontological Anti-Realism”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman 2009, pp. 77–129.
Chalmers, D., D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds.), 2009, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Everett, A., 2007, “Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 56–80.
Garcia-Carpintero, M. and G. Marti (eds.), 2014, Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Geach, P., 1967, “Intentional Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, no. 20, pp. 627–632.
Kaplan, D., 1989, “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.) 1989, pp. 481–566.
Kripke, S., 2013, Reference and Existence, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Meinong, A., 1960, “The Theory of Objects”, in R. Chisholm (ed.), I. Levi, B.D. Terrell, and R. Chisholm (trans.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Ridgeview Publishing, New York, pp. 76–117.
Miller, B., 1986, “ ‘Exists’ and Existence”, The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 237–270.
Moltmann, F., 2020, “Existence Predicates”, Synthese, vol. 197, pp. 311–335.
Moltmann, F., 2013, “The Semantics of Existence”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 36, pp. 31–63.
Noveck, I. and N. Spotorno, 2013, “Narrowing”, in L. Goldstein (ed.), Brevity, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Pietroski, P., 2005, “Meaning Before Truth”, in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Priest, G., 2005, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Clarendon, Oxford.
Quine, W.V.O., 1948, “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics, vol. 2, pp. 21–38.
Recanati, F., 2010, Truth Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Reimer, M., 2001, “A ‘Meinongian’ Solution to a Millian Problem”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 233–248.
Russell, B., 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind, vol. 14, no. 56, pp. 479–493.
Sainsbury, M., 2009, Fiction and Fictionalism, Routledge, London.
Salmon, N., 2014, “What is Existence?”, in M. Garcia-Carpintero and G. Marti (eds.) 2014, pp. 245–261.
Salmon, N., 1998, “Nonexistence”, Noûs, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 277–319.
Schaffer, J., 2009, “On What Grounds What”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.) 2009, pp. 347–383.
Thomasson, A., 1999, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Van Inwagen, P., 2003, “Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities”, in M. Loux, and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Van Inwagen, P., 1977, “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 299–308.
Von Solodkoff, T., 2014, “Fictional Realism and Negative Existentials”, in M. Garcia-Carpintero and G. Marti (eds.) 2014, pp. 333–352.
Walton, K., 1990, Memesis as Make Believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Yablo, S., 2001, “Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 72–102.
Yablo, S. and A. Gollois, 1998, “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 229–262.
Zalta, E., 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, MIT Press, Cambridge.
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