Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology

Contenido principal del artículo

Jeroen Hopster
Michael Klenk


¿Qué papel desempeña la psicología moral y empírica para la metaética? En este artículo analizamos el argumento evolutivo de Michael Ruse contra el realismo moral y lo contrastamos con las últimas investigaciones empíricas. El argumento de Ruse depende de la asunción fenomenológica de que la gente generalmente considera la moralidad como objetiva. Demostramos cómo las recientes investigaciones experimentales desafían esta asunción ampliamente compartida y no contrastada experimentalmente, por lo que concluimos que el argumento de Ruse falla. Nuestras conclusiones se sitúan en el reciente debate sobre la explicación de Carnap y muestran el papel necesario que la psicología moral y empírica tienen en la preparación de explicaciones. La psicología moral establece los límites de los desiderata metaéticos razonables, y, por tanto, es necesaria para la metaética.


Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Detalles del artículo

Cómo citar
Hopster, J., & Klenk, M. (2020). Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(155), 27–54. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1193

Métricas de PLUMX


Appiah, A., 2009, Experiments in Ethics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Barkhausen, M., 2016, “Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution”, Ethics, vol. 126, no. 3, pp. 662–689. (doi: 10.1086/684708).

Beebe, J.R., 2014, “How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments”, in Hagop Sarkissian and Jennifer Cole Wright (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology, Bloomsbury Academic, London, pp. 167–187.

Bergmann, M. and P. Kain, 2014, Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Blackburn, S., 1984, Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Bonnefon, J.-F., A. Shariff and I. Rahwan, 2016, “The Social Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles”, Science, vol. 352, no. 6293, pp. 1573–1576. (doi: 10.1126/science.aaf2654).

Braddock, M., 2016, “Debunking Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion”, Theology and Science, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 268–287. (doi: 10.1080/14746700.2016.1191878).

Brink, D.O., 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Carnap, R., 1950, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago University Press, Chicago, Ill.

Casullo, A. and J.C. Thurow, 2013, The A Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Clarke-Doane, J., 2016, “Debunking and Dispensability”, in Uri D. Leibowitz and Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 23–36.

DeScioli, P., 2016, “The Side-Taking Hypothesis for Moral Judgment”, Current Opinion in Psychology, vol. 7, pp. 23–27. (doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.002).

DeScioli, P. and R. Kurzban, 2013, “A Solution to the Mysteries of Morality”, Psychological bulletin, vol. 139, no. 2, pp. 477–496. (doi: 10.1037/a0029065).

Doris, J.M. and A. Plakias, 2008, “How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 303–331.

Enoch, D., 2015, “Why I Am an Objectivist about Ethics (And Why You Are, Too)”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Enoch, D., 2011, Taking Morality Seriously. A Defense of Robust Realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Fisher, M., J. Knobe, B. Strickland and F.C. Keil, 2017, “The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity”, Cognitive Science, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 1119–1134. (doi: 10.1111/cogs.12380).

Gert, B. and J. Gert, 2017, “The Definition of Morality”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall.

Goodwin, G.P. and J.M. Darley, 2012, “Why Are Some Moral Beliefs Perceived to be More Objective Than Others?”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 250–256. (doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.08.006).

Goodwin, G.P. and J.M. Darley, 2010, “The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 161–188. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-009–0013–4).

Goodwin, G.P. and J.M. Darley, 2008, “The Psychology of Meta-ethics: Exploring Objectivism”, Cognition, vol. 106, no. 3, pp. 1339–1366. (doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.007).

Graham, J., J. Haidt, S. Koleva, M. Motyl, R. Iyer, S.P. Wojcik and P.H. Ditto, 2013, “Moral Foundations Theory”, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 47, pp. 55–130.

Greene, J.D., 2016, “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality”, in S. Matthew Liao (ed.), Moral Brains, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 119–149.

Harman, G., 1977, The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics, Oxford University Press, New York.

Hopster, J., 2019a, “Explaining Historical Moral Convergence”, Philosophical Studies, pp. 1–19. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01251-x).

Hopster, J., 2019b, “The Metaethical Implications of Experiments about Folk Moral Objectivism”, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 32, pp. 831–852. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2019.1627304).

Joyce, R., 2006, The Evolution of Morality, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Khoo, J. and J. Knobe, 2016, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics”, Noûs, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 109–143. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12151).

Kitcher, P., 2011, The Ethical Project, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Kitcher, P., 2006, “Ethics and Evolution: How to Get Here from There”, in Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober (eds.), Primates and Philosophers, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Klenk, M., 2019a, “Evolutionary Ethics”, Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics, ed. George W. Matthews, Rebus Community.

Klenk, M., 2019b, “Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology”, Zeitschrift f`‘ur Ethik und Moralphilosophie, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 331–353. (doi: 10.1007/s42048-019-00040-9).

Klenk, M., 2018a, “Evolution and Moral Disagreement”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 112–142. (doi: 10.26556/jesp.v14i2.476).

Klenk, M., 2018b, “Survival of Defeat: Evolution, Moral Objectivity, and Undercutting”, PhD thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht.

Klenk, M., 2017, “Old Wine in New Bottles”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 781–795. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-017-9797-y).

Lindauer, M., 2019, “Experimental Philosophy and the Fruitfulness of Normative Concepts”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 31. (doi: 10.1007/s11098–019–01302–3).

Mackie, J.L., 1977, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin Books, London.

McPherson, T. and D. Plunkett, 2020, “Conceptual Ethics and the Methodology of Normative Inquiry”, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 274–303.

McPherson, T. and D. Plunkett, 2017, “The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics”, in Tristram Colin McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge
Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge, New York, pp. 1–25.

Moore, G.E., 1903 [2004], Principia Ethica, Dover Publications, Mineola, New York.

Nichols, S., 2004, Sentimental Rules. On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.

Pinder, M., 2017, “Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian Explication?”, Ratio, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 443–461. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12164).

Pölzler, T., 2018, Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences, Routledge, New York.

Prinz, J.J., 2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ruse, M., 2009, “The Biological Sciences can Act as a Ground for Ethics”, in Francisco J. Ayala and Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, United Kingdom, pp. 297–315.

Ruse, M., 1998, Taking Darwin Seriously. A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York.

Ruse, M., 1995a, “Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen”, in R. Paul Thompson (ed.), Issues in Evolutionary Ethics, SUNY series in Philosophy and Biology, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, pp. 225–248.

Ruse, M., 1995b, Evolutionary Naturalism. Selected Essays, Routledge, London.

Sarkissian, H., 2016, “Aspects of Folk Morality: Objectivism and Relativism”, in Justin M. Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken, New Jersey, vol. 61, pp. 212–224.

Sarkissian, H., J. Park, D. Tien, J.C. Wright and J. Knobe, 2011, “Folk Moral Relativism”, Mind & Language, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 482–505. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x).

Sauer, H., 2019, “The Argument from Agreement”, Ratio, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 339–352. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12233).

Shafer-Landau, R., 2003, Moral Realism. A Defence, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, Oxford, New York.

Shepherd, J. and J. Justus, 2015, “X-Phi and Carnapian Explication”, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 381–402.

Stanford, P.K., 2018, “The Difference between Ice Cream and Nazis: Moral Externalization and the Evolution of Human Cooperation”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 41, p. 28. (doi: 10.1017/S0140525X17001911).

Sterelny, K. and B. Fraser, 2016, “Evolution and Moral Realism”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, axv060. (doi: 10.1093/bjps/axv060).

Street, S., 2006, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 127, no. 1, pp. 109–166.

Tomasello, M., 2016, A Natural History of Human Morality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Wilson, E.O., 1975, Sociobiology. The New Synthesis, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Wright, J.C., P.T. Grandjean and C.B. McWhite, 2013, “The Meta-Ethical Grounding of Our Moral Beliefs”, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 336–361. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.633751).

Wright, J.C., C.B. McWhite and P.T. Grandjean, 2014, “The Cognitive Mechanisms of Intolerance: Do our Metaethical Commitments Matter?”, in Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo and Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Oxford Bibliographical Society, Oxford, vol. 1., pp. 28–61.