Love, Reasons, and Replaceability
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Abstract
Lovers typically entertain two sorts of thoughts about their beloveds. On the one hand, they think that the qualities of their beloveds provide reasons for loving them. On the other, they regard their beloveds as irreplaceable. Yet it may be asked how these two sorts of thoughts can coherently coexist. If Romeo loves Juliet in virtue of her qualities, shouldn’t another maiden with the same qualities be equally lovable for him? This paper draws some distinctions that are crucial to the understanding of reasons for love. Its aim is to show that, even though the claim that beloveds are irreplaceable is plausible to some extent, there is a sense in which beloveds are replaceable.
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References
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