Against Magnitude Realism
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En trabajos recientes, Christopher Peacocke ha defendido una especie de realismo (o antirreduccionismo) sobre magnitudes como la temperatura y la distancia espacial. El argumento de Peacocke es que las magnitudes son un compromiso ineliminable de las explicaciones científicas y cotidianas (incluidas las explicaciones de alto nivel), y que son las candidatas naturales para los valores semánticos de nuestro discurso ordinario sobre magnitudes y para los contenidos de nuestros estados mentales. Critico estos argumentos, centrándome en particular en si el realista tiene una explicación satisfactoria de cómo los hechos de magnitud de alto nivel están fundamentados en hechos de más bajo nivel. Argumento que es preferible, o al menos viable, un enfoque menos realista (es decir, más reduccionista). También pretendo aclarar sustancialmente lo que está en juego en el debate.
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Lee, G. (2023). Against Magnitude Realism. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 55(163), 13–44. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1407
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Chalmers, David J., 2012, Constructing the World, Oxford University Press, New York.
Dasgupta, Shamik, 2013, “Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantities”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 12, pp. 105–150.
Dasgupta, Shamik, forthcoming, “How to be a Relationist”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
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Sider, Theodore, 2012, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford University Press, New York.
Sider, Theodore, 1997, “Four Dimensionalism”, Philosophical Review, vol. 106, pp. 197–231.
Sprevak, Mark, 2018, “Triviality Arguments about Computational Implementation”, in Mark Sprevak and Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Computational Mind, Routledge, London.
Suppes, Patrick and Joseph L. Zinnes, 1963, “Basic Measurement Theory”, in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush, and Eugene Galanter (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, volume 1, Wiley, New York.
Swoyer, Chris, 1987, “The Metaphysics of Measurement”, in J. Forge (ed.), Measurement, Realism and Objectivity: Essays on Measurement in the Social and Physical Sciences, Thompson Reidel, Dordrecht.
Wilson, Jessica, 2021, Metaphysical Emergence, Oxford University Press, New York.
Baker, David John, 2020, “Some Consequences of Physics for the Comparative Metaphysics of Quantity”, in Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 75–112.
Chalmers, David J., 2012, Constructing the World, Oxford University Press, New York.
Dasgupta, Shamik, 2013, “Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantities”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 12, pp. 105–150.
Dasgupta, Shamik, forthcoming, “How to be a Relationist”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
Devitt, Michael, 1980, “ ‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism?’ ”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 61, pp. 433–439.
Dorr, Cian, 2016, “To be F is to be G”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 1–97.
Eddon, M., 2013, “Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 8, pp. 78–104.
Euclid, 1956, The Thirteen Books of the Elements, vol. 2, Books III–IX, tr. T. Heath, second edition, Dover, New York.
Field, Hartry, 1980, Science without Numbers, Oxford University Press, New York.
Hölder, Otto, 1901, “Die Axiome der Quantität und die Lehre vom Mass”, Bericht. Sächsisch Akademie der Wissenschaften, Math-Physik Klasse, vol. 53, pp. 1–64.
Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics of Ethics, Oxford Clarendon Press, New York.
Kant, Immanuel, 1998, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lange, Marc, 2002, An Introduction to this Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy and Mass, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
Lee, G., manuscript, “Getting out of Ghost World: Grounding and Highlevel Structure”.
Lewis, David, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, David, 1983, “New Work for the Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 343–377.
Maudlin, Tim, 2007, The Metaphysics within Physics, Oxford University Press, New York.
McLaughlin, Brian P., 1992, The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism, in Hans Flohr, Ansgar Beckermann y Kim Jaegwon (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter, Berlin.
McQueen, Kelvin J., 2015, “Mass Additivity and A Priori Entailment”, Synthese, vol. 192, pp. 1373–1392.
Michell, Joel, 2003, The Quantative Imperative. Theory and Psychology, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 5–31.
Michell, Joel, 1999, Measurement in Psychology: Critical History of a Methodological Concept, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Mundy, Brent, 1987, “The Metaphysics of Quantities”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 51, pp. 29–54.
Peacocke, Christopher, 2019, The Primacy of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, New York.
Peacocke, Christopher, 2014, “Magnitudes: Exposition of a Realistic Ontology”, Proceedings of the 2013 Kirchberg Symposium.
Peacocke, Christopher, 1993, “Externalist Explanation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. 93, pp. 203–230.
Perry, Zee R., 2015, “Properly Extensive Quantities”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 82, pp. 833–844.
Putnam, Hilary, 1988, Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Quine, W.V., 1948, “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics, reprinted in Willard van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Schaffer, Jonathan, 2017a, “The Ground between the Gaps”, Philosophers Imprint, vol. 17, no. 11.
Schaffer, Jonathan, 2017b, “Laws for Metaphysical Explanation”, Philosophical Issues, vol. 27, Metaphysics, pp. 302–321.
Scott, Dana, 1963, A General Theory of Magnitudes, Mimeo Circulating at the Mathematical Institute, Oxford University in the 1970s.
Shoemaker, Sydney, 1988, “On What There Are”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 201–223.
Sider, Theodore, 2012, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford University Press, New York.
Sider, Theodore, 1997, “Four Dimensionalism”, Philosophical Review, vol. 106, pp. 197–231.
Sprevak, Mark, 2018, “Triviality Arguments about Computational Implementation”, in Mark Sprevak and Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Computational Mind, Routledge, London.
Suppes, Patrick and Joseph L. Zinnes, 1963, “Basic Measurement Theory”, in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush, and Eugene Galanter (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, volume 1, Wiley, New York.
Swoyer, Chris, 1987, “The Metaphysics of Measurement”, in J. Forge (ed.), Measurement, Realism and Objectivity: Essays on Measurement in the Social and Physical Sciences, Thompson Reidel, Dordrecht.
Wilson, Jessica, 2021, Metaphysical Emergence, Oxford University Press, New York.
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