Natural Selection and the Nature of Statistical Explanations
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Existe una interpretación filosófica aceptada de la selección natural en la teoría evolutiva: la selección natural, junto con la mutación, la migración y la deriva, se consideran fuerzas que impulsan la evolución de las poblaciones. En consecuencia, la selección natural es un proceso causal a nivel de población. Los estadísticos han criticado este enfoque argumentando que la selección natural no es una causa a nivel de población, sino más bien una característica estadística de una población. Este artículo examina la naturaleza del debate ontológico mencionado y la naturaleza de las explicaciones estadísticas proporcionadas por la genética de poblaciones. Sostengo que la síntesis moderna proporciona buenas explicaciones de los cambios en la estructura de rasgos de las poblaciones sin recurrir a información causal detallada.
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