Álgebras de universales
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Varios filósofos han propuesto un enfoque “algebraico” de los universales de acuerdo con el cual hay operaciones de universales a universales. No es obvio, sin embargo, cómo estas operaciones deban ser interpretadas y qué impacto tengan para las condiciones de identidad de los universales. Hay dos interpretaciones principales del álgebra de universales. Por una parte, se ha interpretado como formas de “construir” universales complejos. Por otra, ha sido interpretada como “morfismos” o “mapeos” entre universales, pero no como algo que “construye” universales complejos desde otros más básicos. En este trabajo se evalúan las ventajas comparativas de las dos concepciones, y se ofrecen razones para preferir la segunda.
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