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Abstract

Expressions such as "The man who is ten feet tall", "The house with ten thousand doors", "The third part of Don Quijote", "The child who refuted Gödel's theorem", and of course "The golden mountain" and "The present King of France", are definite descriptions that speak of individuals or objects which do not actually exist; they are expressions that refer, but their reference is empty, although this is due to contingent reasons. Thus, the reference of these expressions can cease to be empty: for when we say that it is empty on account of reasons which are not necessary, we are affirming that it could be the case that at some time there might exist the object to which they are now referring. It is contradictory to suppose that these expressions are empty because of empirical reasons and that they do not denote the same thing when their reference is empty and when it is not.

Concerning propositions such as "The golden mountain does not exist", "The child who refuted Gödel's theorem does not exist", it has been observed that if they are meaningful, they have to denote something: if they don't, they would be a flatus. Then, if the proposition has a meaning, the denoted object would have to exist; but then the proposition would not be true, but false. However, it is true. An embarrasing situation would thus arise: there would be no way of explaining how it is possible that negative existential propositions could be meaningful and true. The solution would be to accept the fact that they denote subsistent objects or individuals, or objects with ideal or logical existence: the definite description of the proposition "The golden mountain does not exist" would denote a subsistent object from which it is predicated that it does not exist spatio-temporally —thus saving its meaning and maintaining the original truth-value—. The new entities would guarantee the meaning of that class of propositions.

In what is put forth, a very close connection is established between referred entities and the meaning of the definite description: the meaning would be fixed by the denoted object. Furthermore, the term 'meaning' is being understood in the sense according to which it is correct to say that "The golden mountain does not exist" is a proposition whose meaning is different from "The child who refuted Gödel's theorem does not exist"; it is the sense that we use when we affirm that a proposition in spanish means the same as a certain proposition expressed in another language. It is that which is more or less equivalent to what we understand by the 'content' of a proposition. We can see that 'meaning' is being used in that way, in the fact that, once it is decided to postulate an entity, it is not proposed any entity, but that which according to the cases, responds to the content of the proposition: The golden mountain, the child who refuted Gödel's theorem.

The expression 'normal meaning' is introduced. 'Meaning' is taken in the described sense, and by 'normal meaning' would have to be understood simply the content that a proposition, in fact, has, or one wants to give it in a determined discursive context. If someone affirms "The golden mountain does not exist", and he maintains that this is true because spatio-temporally such a mountain does not exist, we will say that its normal meaning consists in referring in a determined manner to a spatio-temporal mountain. In respect to our problem, we will find ourselves confronted with the following situation:

(a) that the 'meaning' of a proposition cannot be explained with· out accepting the existence, or subsistence, of an entity;
(b) that the problem, without any doubt, comes out apropos of the 'normal meaning' of certain propositions. The 'normal meaning' of certain types of propositions is the datum which generates the problem.
Now then, from (a) and (b) it can easily be concluded that:
(c) the subsistent or ideal entities are introduced in order to save the 'normal meaning' of the proposition in question. In fact, the question was to see how it was possible that a proposition such as "The golden mountain does not exist" could have the 'normal meaning' that actually has when it is the 'normal meaning' itself that seems to demand that the entity to which it refers does not exist. The normal meanings of these propositions are ones which create a conceptual problem; so we try to find a solution which would preserve the 'normal meaning' and would not come into conflict with what has been affirmed in (a).
However,
(d) if, as it happens here, we are dealing with the 'normal meaning', then this requires a determined object or entitv or individual, -and not, as it has been said, any individual entity. If it is intent to 'save' the normal meaning of a specific proposition, the entity which is supposed to he necessary, must correspond, necessarily, to the content of the proposition.

So, if an entity is proposed which does not correspond to the normal meaning of the proposition, it does not explain or save it. Even more: the normal meaning would be altered. In fact, a proposition which refers in a determined way to spatio-temporal mountain, passes into a proposition which speaks of an ideal, logical, or subsistent golden mountain. And, no matter what this proposition would be, no matter how it might be analysed, it would doubtless be a different proposition. Then, if a different entity is postulated to that which requires the normal meaning, the result would be that when a proposition is affirmed whose subject does not exist spatio-temporally, we would always be speaking of another thing. Briefly, the proposed solution applies to such a sense of 'meaning' that the change of the entity will alter and transform it: normal meaning does not tolerate ontological indetermination.

If this is correct, we are faced with a vicious reasoning. The normal meanings of a certain type of propositions present a problem, but the form of resolving it does not pay respect to the data that originated it: the subsistent entities are introduced in order to save normal meaning, however, they do not explain how is it possible that that proposition could have that normal meaning —because another proposition is necessarily generated—.

Furthermore, if these expressions are empty because of empirical reasons, they must refer to the same thing to which they would refer if they were not empty. But according with the criticized interpretation, in the proposition "The golden mountain does not exist", the definite description does not have the same reference which has in "The golden mountain exists", if the later were true. The consequence would be that "The golden mountain does not exist" is not the negation of "The golden mountain exists": one proposition would say that the subsistent golden mountain does not exist spatio-temporally, and the other that spatio-temporally there exists such a mountain; there is no motive for viewing the first as the negation of the second. Now, from the truth of the proposition "The golden mountain exists" follows the truth of the proposition “The golden mountain' is not empty”. Pari passu, from the truth of "The golden mountain does not exist" follows the truth of "'The golden mountain' is empty". But if "The golden mountain does not exist" is not the negation of "The golden mountain exists", then "'The golden mountain' is empty" is doubtless a proposition which is always false. But if it always false, it is not the case that these definite descriptions would be of the type of those that might be empty. And this is equivalent to the alteration of certain data of the problem: the introduction of new entities is incompatible with the characterization of these expressions as being empty because of contingent reasons. And nevertheless, the difficulties are formulated in the basis of those characteristics, since the normal meanings imply that the object or individual referred by the definite description might not exist. In the case of "The golden mountain does not exist" what is being affirmed is that there is no such object, and, a fortiori, that the expression "The golden mountain" might be empty. To deny it is to fall again into a vicious reasoning.

From what has been said before it can be deduced that the alteration of the meaning of this class of propositions is produced whatever the type of the new entities may be. It is of little import that open Platonism or its contrary is chosen: the result is the same, since the normal meaning supposes a determined entity and any change affects it.

Then it is examined, in its different aspects, a variation of the former problem, that is, that which recurs to 'intentional objects', and it is concluded that there is also a changing of the terms of the problem: it starts with a proposition whose semantic characteristics involve certain difficulties and proposes a solution that yields, as a result, another proposition.

As a conclusion, two observations may be made. In the first place, we insist that the solution which recurs to ideal entities it is not only defective because it obliges us to accept them, since that would imply that these entities could resolve the problem in some manner. The fault is deeper: if new entities are postulated, we don't get a possible solution or a more or less comprehensible theory, but both the solution and the theory are not even conceivable. In the second place, it is noted that the alteration of the meaning overcomes when the first premise —necessity of entitiesis interpreted in terms of the normal meaning, as if that premise would speak of the normal meaning—. However, if we ask ourselves from where does that premise derives its force, we see that it is not based in some observation relative to the normal meanings of these propositions, since they can be empty and have a meaning; this is, precisely, one of the data of the problem. If we only pay attention to those it is impossible to reach the first premise. Furthermore, the explanation suggested is the opposed one. Then, from where does that thesis originate? Our suspicion, that we will not analyze in detail, is that it is founded in a very general consideration concerning words: in what we could call the Transitivity of all linguistic signs. That is to say, the idea that a certain sign is a word, or is an element of language, in the measure in which it is a symbol of something. It is then said: the meaning of a word consists in its connection with something, of which it is precisely the symbol. But with that it is not mantained that all words must be interpreted as substantives or as names, but it would simply amount to say that words are symbols -and so is understandable the opposition drawn between a word and a flatus. It would be a kind of definition of 'word'. And then distinctions between the different uses of words may be made. Now then, if this is the area where the first premise may result plausible or even valid, it is true also that we are dealing there with a sense of 'meaning' that does not keep any resemblance with the normal meaning. This last can be empty without ceasing to be true the thesis concerning the symbolic nature of the expressions or of the words which compose it. There is no parallelism. If we distinguish between them, the problem does not arise, and there is no ground for the postulation of an entity denoted by "The present King of France". The first premise would only compel us to recognice the transitive character of that complex sign; but it would not force us to admit new entities, nor to always explain the content of the expression in terms of individual objects.