"Modern" Philosophers of Science

Abstract

I. Introduction
J.A. Coffa proposes the categorization of contemporary philosophers of science in two groups: “classical” and “modern”. The modern philosophers of science contend that there are statements that function as categorical principles inasmuch as they constitute our experience of the world. This contention apparently implies a return to Kant.
In this article, a distinction is made between the theses of the modern philosophers of science and their classical colleagues (Section II), a subclass of modern philosophers of science (modern1) is considered (Section III), and the inappropiateness of attributing a return to Kant to the modern philosophers of science is defended.
II. Modern philosophers of science: fundamental theses
We will refer to three philosophers of science (Sellars, Kuhn and Feyerabend) to illustrate the fundamental theses of the modern philosophers of science.
(1) The notion of theory
(a) The notion of theory is modified by the presence of principles that were not taken into account before.
(b) The concept of theory has lost its central role in the explication of what science is.
Sellar’s fundamental notion is the conceptual framework, in particular, the framework of common sense, which is radically false, and the framework of scientific theories, which results from the postulation of non-perceptible objects and events to explain the relations which are confirmed between perceptible objects. On the other hand, Sellars does not share the classical conception of the construction of theories (elaboration of a set of postulates related to observational discourse). According to Sellars, the scientist normally tries to create a model which permits him to take phenomena as consisting of those objects.
The basic concept in Kuhn’s analysis of scientific activity is that of the paradigm, which is broader and more complete than the classical concept of theory.
Feyerabend, on the other hand, recognizes that scientific theories are ways of looking at the world, to such a degree that the world of experience is our own creation. In relation to theories, Feyerabend abandons the principle of consistency, while in relation to the logical structure of theories, he establishes that the two-language model cannot be accepted because it leads to internal contradictions. Finally, the logical-deductive structure of theories according to the classical philosophers is closely linked to their theses of reduction and/or explanation. But Feyerabend shows, in fact, through historical examples, that the deductive scheme does not adapt to these examples.
(2) The theory-experience relation
The classical philosophers of science made a radical separation between theory and experience. Experience, according to the modern group, is constituted by principles. The conceptual framework of scientific theories, for Sellars, conditions experience in such a way that it is impossible to accept a non-theoretical language (in a strict sense) which could be linked to a theoretical language. There is no such thing as “the given” independent from the categorical activity of the subject.
For Kuhn the theory-fact distinction is not previous to the analysis of scientific knowledge, but rather is part of a theory and therefore should be examined as any other theory would. On the other hand, the paradigm in periods of normal science determines puzzles and guarantees their solution. The paradigms are conditions previous to perception itself; in short, paradigms determine experience.
Feyerabend sustains that there are no brute facts; facts are essentially theoretical. Science without experience is possible. This means that it is possible to imagine a natural science without sensory elements.
(3) The subject
The modern philosophers of science revalue the subject of scientific activity. Sellars concludes that the role of the subject is central and fundamental. The knowing subject is the basic ingredient in proposed explanations.
In Kuhn, the concept of scientific community plays the fundamental role. For him, scientific knowledge is explicable only in terms of the characteristics of the scientific community.
According to Feyerabend, it is necessary to establish a new methodology which takes science into account but which, unlike the classic methodologies, also takes religion, metaphysics, etc., into consideration. This would give way to a new history of science.
(4) Incommensurability
The modern philosophers of science share the thesis that two different scientific theories are incommensurable. In Sellars, the conceptual framework gives birth to a new ontology with new meanings for terms, such that the meanings are incomparable without the possibility of translation. For Kuhn, scientific revolutions make all succeeding scientific traditions incommensurable, and there is no possibility of a neutral language because it does not exist. Since Feyerabend defends the principle of proliferation and the principle of non-invariance, it can be concluded that for him two different theories are always incommensurable.
(5) The relation between science and philosophy
Philosophy is neither (a) merely a discourse without meaning; (b) merely a recourse of analysis of scientific discourse (Carnap); (c) a reflection stemming from the results of science and about the results of science (Reichenbach), nor (d) only valuable in a historical-scientific context (Popper).
Sellars considers that the object of philosophy is to establish how things are related; its distinctive characteristic is “a look at the whole”. Kuhn, in the other hand, asserts that philosophical analysis takes place in times of crisis, during which philosophers contribute to the explication of ideas. Feyerabend concedes to philosophy both autonomy and an important role in relation to science. He uses certain philosophers (Hegel, for example) to explain what happens in science; for him, philosophy can help to free us from the idea of science, which he opposes.
III. Modern1 Philosophers of science: Additional notes
Within the group of modern philosophers of science, there is a subgroup which shares only some of the groups’ ideas. Kuhn and Feyerabend fit into this subgroup, but Sellars does not. Since the theses of the modern1 group deal with the very important problems of the philosophy of science, such as method and scientific rationality, great importance will be attached to the proposals of this subgroup in order to understand the real epistemological revolution that they imply.
(6) The distinction between discovery context and justification context
This distinction, adopted without criticism by the classical philosophers, is rejected by the modern1 subgroup. Kuhn does not accept that this distinction be shown priority in regards to analysis of knowledge; he submits, rather, that it be subject to the same treatment as all other theories. For Feyerabend to apply such a distinction would produce an epistemological fantasy, since such a distinction would never be made in scientific practice.
(7) Scientific method
The method (or methods) proposed by the classical philosophers of science are rejected by this subgroup.
In Kuhn, the method is related to the paradigm; in each paradigm there is a group of rules and procedures which resolve the corresponding puzzles. In periods of revolution there is no general method to be found.
Feyerabend, in his last works, points out that the idea of a fixed method for science is refuted by scientific fact throughout the history of science.
(8) Non-scientific questions and values
In order to analyze the sciences it is impossible to avoid posing questions and referring to theses outside of logic or scientific methodology. Therefore, Kuhn proposes that (a) all analysis of science should explicate the historical integrity of a science in its own times; (b) in periods of revolution there is a resistance to abandoning the old paradigm because the community has faith in being able to solve its problems (and if change is brought about it is by conversion based principally on persuasion); and (c) change can be explained by the value system or ideology that scientists share.
For Feyerabend, logic is not enough to explain the development of science; science must be taken in a much broader context. The choice between two theories based on interests, conditioned by the value system of the society. The supreme value for Feyerabend is the cultivation of individuality, which is the only thing that can produce adequately developed human beings.
(9) Rationality
All philosophers of science, whether they be classical or modern, have a definition of rationality, for science is a rational activity par excellence. But the modern1 group’s view of rationality has certain characteristics of its own that would be considered irrational by a classical philosopher of science. Kuhn does not deny the interference of rational elements in scientific activity and especially in the choice between theories; he contends, however, that these are neither sufficient nor decisive in the development of science. What he proposes is a different model of rationality. Feyerabend, on the other hand, sustains that scientific activity cannot be reduced to a merely argumentative exercise.
IV. Return to Kant?
It would be possible to speak of a return to Kant if a philosopher or group of philosophers (in this case the modern philosophers of science) proposed theses or invoked theories similar to Kant’s.
In Kuhn, the concept that would seem to have Kantian overtones would be that of the paradigm. But the paradigms conceived as shared examples are produced by an interplay with facts; they are obviously not a priori. Besides, in Kant, categorical principles are unique; in Kuhn it is possible to pass from one paradigm to another, creating a different experience.
For Sellars, science deals with the noumenic; for Kant, on the other hand, science only deals with the phenomenic. For Sellars, as for Kuhn, it is possible to abandon one conceptual framework and adopt another; this is in direct opposition to Kant’s proposal of categorial principles.
Feyerabend is a distinctly non-Kantian in his rejection of the generality and omnipresence of the categorial principles: these two characteristics prevent that the principles be refuted and therefore changed. Feyerabend, however, advocates the possibility and even the necessity of such a change.
Besides, Kant conceived the method as unique an unalterable, whereas Feyerabend sustains the impossibility of a permanent method. While Kant considered science as the exclusive product of reason, Feyerabend assigns an important role to impulse. Finally, how can Kantism be attributed to a philosopher who uses Hegel to explicate the characteristics and development of scientific knowledge?
In conclusion, from what we have seen above, it would seem implausible to affirm that the theses that the modern philosophers of science propose imply a return to Kant.
(Ricardo Gómez)