Changes of Reference: Kripke and Putnam
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Abstract
One of the most usual objections put forward against the causal theory of reference is that it cannot account for the changes of reference that our terms may experience. The aim of this paper is to examine the position on reference change adopted by two of the most important supporters of the causal reference theory, Kripke and Putnam.
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How to Cite
Fernández Moreno, L. (2018). Changes of Reference: Kripke and Putnam. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 38(114), 45–67. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2006.488
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Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License.
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