A Defense of the Contrastive Theory of Causation

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Esteban Céspedes

Abstract

An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.

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How to Cite
Céspedes, E. (2018). A Defense of the Contrastive Theory of Causation. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 47(140), 65–91. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2015.503

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