Tarskian Semantics, Natural Language and Ontology

Abstract

As a first step, this paper presents the two main variants of the contemporary semantical approach which takes truth-conditions as the key-concept to develop the ideas of meaning and understanding. Sorne criticisms of that approach are examined in light of that approach's theoretical goal. My claim is that the criticisms do not essentially affect the programme. Differences are pointed out between Davidson’s and Montague’s variants within this programme. My thesis is that when the main theoretical goal is to explain linguistic understanding; there are reasons to prefer the former. There are also reasons for this choice when the goal is to look for a semantics appropriate for characterizing ontological positions that depend upon epistemic constraints. However, Montague’s variants are preferable when one tries to state an ontology without taking into account epistemic factors.

[Traducción: Raúl Orayen]