La objetividad de los números fregeanos

Abstract

In section 1 I discuss some arguments suggested by Dummet's work, aimed to support the claim that the real problem between realism and antirealism is one about the meaningfulness of sentences. I give sorne reasons to consider them less than conclusive, and to mantain the importance of the traditional approach in terms of the nature of the referred objects.

In section 2 I give an account of Frege's view on the objectivity of arithmetic and its relationship with the objectivity of numbers. I defend the possibility of a partially constructivistic interpretation of Frege's analysis.

In section 3 Husserl's criticisms of Frege are summed up. I claim that they are not efficient in their original version but it is also suggested that the objections can be rephrased in such a way that they come closer to Benacerraf's criticism on Platonismo An abstractionist altemative, connected with the Erlangen Program, is examined. According to what was said in section 2, it is suggested that even though Frege's view is still unsatisfactory, it is not refuted and the abstractionist view is even weaker.
[Traducción de Raúl Orayen]