The Constitution of Physical Objects in the Aufbau: Quine vs Carnap
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Abstract
In this paper it is argued that Quine’s critic of Carnap’s radical reductionism (“The second dogma of empiricism”) is based on an incomplete comprehension of the project that Carnap pursued in the Aufbau. This paper offers a novel interpretation of the twelve steps that Carnap proposed for the construction of physical objects. Further, are cent proposal of Thomas Mormann concerning this issue is criticized.
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How to Cite
Cardona Suárez, C. A. (2019). The Constitution of Physical Objects in the Aufbau: Quine vs Carnap. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 42(124), 51–76. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.900
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Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License.
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