Superafirmabilidad, justificación, y los retos de una verdad antirrealista
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La superafirmabilidad (SA) pretende ser una noción antirrealista de verdad en discursos como lo cómico, lo moral y lo social, donde la verdad depende de los juicios de los sujetos. Su éxito radica en que una justificación incrementada puede ser estable: una afirmación seguiría estando justificada pese a la aparición de nueva información. No obstante, SA enfrenta dificultades para alcanzar esa estabilidad debido a una concepción antirrealista restringida del acceso a la evidencia. Propongo reinterpretar la estabilidad mediante una confianza epistémica: un compromiso normativo y práctico que subyace a cualquier acto de afirmación. Cuando alguien afirma p, no solo reconoce la evidencia, sino que asume también racionalmente que la justificación perdurará salvo contraevidencia legítima.
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