Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism

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Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu

Resumen

La percepción moral, para los propósitos de este artículo, se considera la percepción de propiedades morales, a menos que los contextos dicten lo contrario. Si bien tanto los particularistas como los generalistas están de acuerdo en que podemos percibir las propiedades morales de una acción o un rasgo, no están de acuerdo, sin embargo, sobre si las reglas desempeñan un papel esencial en la percepción moral. Los particularistas abogan por una respuesta “no”, mientras que los generalistas dicen “sí”. En este artículo, ofrezco una defensa limitada del particularismo refutando varios argumentos generalistas poderosos. Se espera que el particularismo pueda hacerse más atractivo como teoría de la percepción moral. A lo largo del camino, también se proporcionarán argumentos positivos para el particularismo.

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Cómo citar
Tsu, P. (2020). Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(156), 31–57. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1222
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Artículos

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