Causation and Emergence
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Abstract
I propose to understand the mind-body relationship on the basis of emergentism, although this proposal has not been without difficulties. The efforts of emergentist physicalism to find mental causal powers have resulted in either an eliminativist stance regarding the mental or in its acceptance as a supervenient phenomenon. This article sets out to present the mental as an emerging stage of the physical but without any loss of properties, necessarily passing through the biological as another stage of physical. So mental and biological properties are not restricted to an area separate from the physical world, but represent different kinds of pure physicality.
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Castillo, S. R. (2018). Causation and Emergence. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 50(150), 27–41. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.14
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References
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Place, U.T., 1956, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 44–50. (Reimpreso en W.G. Lycan (comp.), Mind and Cognition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.)
Putnam, Hilary, 1960, “Minds and Machines”, ed. Anderson Alan Ross, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, pp. 72–97.
Smart, J.J.C., 1962, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, en V.C. Chappell (comp.), The Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1962, y reimpreso en D.M. Rosenthal (comp.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 169–176.
Stoljar, David, 2010, Physicalism, Routledge, Nueva York.
Varela, F., E. Thompson, y E. Rosch, 1991, The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. [Versión en castellano: De cuerpo presente. Las ciencias cognitivas y la experiencia humana, trad. Carlos Gardini, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1992.]
Block, Ned, 1980, “What Is Functionalism?”, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 171–184.
Broad, C.D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner/Harcourt, Brace, Londres/Nueva York.
Dennett, Daniel, 1981, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Dennett, Daniel, 1969, Content and Consciousness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Londres. [Versión en castellano: Contenido y conciencia, trad. José María Lebrón, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1996.]
Dretske, Frederick, 1988, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Feigl, Herbert, 1967, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical”’, en Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven y Grover Maxwell (comps.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958, pp. 3–116.
Fodor, Jerry, 1987, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. [Versión en castellano: Psicosemántica. El problema del significado en la filosofía de la mente, trad. Oscar González Castán, Tecnos, Madrid, 1994.]
Fodor, Jerry, 1983, The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psichology, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. [Versión en castellano: La modularidad de la mente. trad. José Manuel Igoa, Morata, Madrid, 1986.]
Hofstadter, Douglas y Daniel Dennett (comps.), 1981, The Mind’s I, Bantam Books, Nueva York.
Kim, Jaegwon, 2014, “El fisicalismo no reduccionista y su problema con la causalidad mental”, Ideas y valores, vol. 63, no. 155, pp. 235–259.
Kim, Jaegwon, 2002, “El problema mente-cuerpo tras cincuenta años”, Azafea: Revista de Filosofía, vol. 4, pp. 45–63.
Kim, Jaegwon, 1998, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Kim, Jaegwon, 1993, “The Nonreductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation”, Supervenience and Mind. Selected Philosophycal Essays, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York, pp. 336–357.
Kim, Jaegwon, 1992, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 1–26.
Kim, Jaegwon, 1989, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 31–47.
Lakoff, George y Mark Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the Flesh. The mbodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, Nueva York.
Lewis, David, 1983, “Mad Pain and Martial Pain”, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 122–130.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1985, Fenomenología de la percepción, trad. Jem Cabanes, Planeta-DeAgostini, Barcelona.
Mill, John Stuart, 1906, A System of Logic. Ratiocinative and Inductive, Longmans, Green and Co., Londres.
Morgan, C. Lloyd, 1923, Emergent Evolution, Williams and Norgate, Londres.
Place, U.T., 1956, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 44–50. (Reimpreso en W.G. Lycan (comp.), Mind and Cognition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.)
Putnam, Hilary, 1960, “Minds and Machines”, ed. Anderson Alan Ross, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, pp. 72–97.
Smart, J.J.C., 1962, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, en V.C. Chappell (comp.), The Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1962, y reimpreso en D.M. Rosenthal (comp.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 169–176.
Stoljar, David, 2010, Physicalism, Routledge, Nueva York.
Varela, F., E. Thompson, y E. Rosch, 1991, The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. [Versión en castellano: De cuerpo presente. Las ciencias cognitivas y la experiencia humana, trad. Carlos Gardini, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1992.]
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