¿Qué es un contexto para las teorías cognitivas del razonamiento?
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Resumen
El artículo tiene como propósito analizar la noción de contexto en algunas de las teorías más importantes en la psicología cognitiva. Argumentaremos que la noción de contexto puede hacer referencia a al menos cinco ideas: la familiaridad del contenido, el formato del problema, la perspectiva del sujeto, la estructura lógica distinta y el ambiente. Indagaremos las relaciones posibles entre dichas nociones de contexto y esbozaremos respuestas a dos preguntas que pueden plantearse al análisis presentado, esto es, cuál es la razón por la que se tienen diferentes nociones de contexto en la psicología cognitiva, y cuál podría ser la consecuencia en los debates sobre razonamiento y racionalidad si se distinguen distintas nociones de contexto.
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García Campos, J., & Sarabia López, S. (2019). ¿Qué es un contexto para las teorías cognitivas del razonamiento?. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 51(151), 85–115. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.04
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Wason, P.C., 1966, “Reasoning”, en B.M. Foss (ed.), New Horizons in Psychology: I, Penguing, Harmondsworth, pp. 106–137.
Bishop, M. y J.D.Trout, 2005, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Bolhuis, J., G. Brown, R. Richardson y K. Laland, 2011, “Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology”, PLOS Biology, vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 1–8.
Buller, D., 2005, Adapting Minds. Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Buller, D., J. Fodor y T. Crume, 2005, “The Emperor Is Still Under- Dressed”, Trends in Cognitive Science, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 508–510.
Chiappe, D. y R. Gardner, 2011, “The Modularity Debate in Evolutionary Psychology”, Theory & Psychology, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 669–682.
Cosmides, L. y J. Tooby, 2005, “Neurocognitive Adaptations Designed for Social Exchange”, en D. Buss (ed.), Evolutionary Psychology Handbook, Willer, Nueva York, pp. 584–627.
Cosmides, L. y J. Tooby, 1997, “Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer”, Center for Evolution- ary Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara; disponible en: https://www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer.html.
Cosmides, L. y J. Tooby, 1996, “Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians after All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Certainty”, Cognition, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 1–73.
Cosmides, L. y J. Tooby, 1992, “Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange”, en J. Barkow et al. (eds.), The Adapted Mind, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, pp. 164–228.
Cosmides, L. y J. Tooby, 1991, “Reasoning and Natural Selection”, Encyclopedia of Human Biology, vol. 6, pp. 493–503.
Fodor, J., 2000, “Why We Are So Good at Catching Cheaters”, Cognition, vol. 75, pp. 29–32.
Gigerenzer, G., 1996, “On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky”, Psychological Review, vol. 103, no. 3, pp. 592–598.
Gigerenzer, G., 1991, “How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond ‘Heuris- tics and Biases’ ”, European Review of Social Psychology, vol. 2, pp. 83– 115.
Gigerenzer, G., P. Todd y Grupo ABC, 1999, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Gigerenzer, G. y K. Hug, 1992, “Domain-Specific Reasoning: Social Con- tracts, Cheating and Perspective Change”, Cognition, vol. 43, pp. 127– 171.
Gigerenzer, G. y R. Selten (eds.), 2001, Bounded Rationality. The Adaptive Toolbox, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Gigerenzer, G. y T. Sturm, 2012, “How (Far) Can Rationality Be Natural- ized?”, Synthese, vol. 187, no. 1, pp. 243–268.
Gigerenzer, G. y U. Hoffrage, 1995, “How to Improve Bayesian Reason- ing without Instruction: Frequency Formats”, Psychological Review, vol. 102, no. 4, pp. 684–704.
Hertwig, R. y G. Gigerenzer, 1999, “The ‘Conjunction Fallacy’ Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors”, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, vol. 12, pp. 275–305.
Kahneman, D. y A. Tversky, 1996, “On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions”, Psychological Review, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 582–591.
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic y A. Tversky, 1982, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Piatelli-Palmarini, M., 2005, Los túneles de la mente, Crítica, Barcelona. Samuels, R., S. Stich y L. Faucher, 2004, “Reason and Rationality”, en I. Niiniluoto et al. (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 131–179.
Stanovich, K. y R. West, 2003, “Evolutionary Versus Instrumental Goals: How Evolutionary Psychology Misconceives Human Rationality”, en D. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking, Psychology Press, East Sussex, pp. 171–230.
Stein, E., 1996, Without Good Reason. The Rationality Debate in Philos- ophy and Cognitive Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Stenning, K. y M. van Lambalgen, 2008, Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Sturm, T., 2012, “The ‘Rationality Wars’ in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go”, Inquiry, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 66–81.
Wason, P.C., 1966, “Reasoning”, en B.M. Foss (ed.), New Horizons in Psychology: I, Penguing, Harmondsworth, pp. 106–137.
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