Sobre la definición de los argumentos conductivos
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Abstract
In 1971, Wellman coined the terms “conduction” and “conductive” to name a distinctive kind of reasoning, different both from deductive and inductive reasoning. Most authors think that the weighing of pros and cons is the distinctive feature of conduction. However I contend that weighing is characteristic of some kinds of argumentation structures while “conductive” applies to the rela- tionship between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. Hence I offer a definition of conductive argument according to which conductive arguments are arguments from verbal classifications involving cluster concepts or compounds of such arguments.
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References
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