Cross-Fictional Quantification in the Artifactual Theory of Fiction
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Abstract
It is acknowledged by proponents of the Artifactual Theory of Fiction that literary works sometimes involve real or immigrant characters. However, their conception of cross-fictional identity faces serious difficulties. In this paper, we set the problem in the context of a modal framework, in relation to quantification across a plurality of possible worlds. Quantification is explained in terms of Hintikka’s notion of world lines; i.e. the possible values of bound variables are individuals that are not reduced to their manifestations. We finally offer another understanding of identity across weakly impermeable domains, in a way compatible with the Artifactual Theory of Fiction.
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Fontaine, M. (2020). Cross-Fictional Quantification in the Artifactual Theory of Fiction. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(154), 49–75. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1174
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References
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Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Currie, G., 1990, The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Fitting, M. and R. Mendelsohn, 1998, First-Order Modal Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Fontaine, M., 2019, “Hintikka, Free Logician”, Logica Universalis, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 179–201.
Fontaine, M., 2013, Argumentation et engagement ontologique – Être, c’est être choisi, College Publications, London.
Fontaine, M. and S. Rahman, 2014, “Towards a Semantics for the Artifactual Theory of Fiction and Beyond”, Synthese, vol. 191, no. 3, pp. 499–516.
Fontaine, M. and S. Rahman, 2012, “Individuality in Fiction and the Creative Role of the Reader”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 539–560.
Fontaine, M. and S. Rahman, 2010, “Fiction, Creation and Fictionality”, Methodos, vol. 10, https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/2343 [accessed 07 April 2010]. (doi: 10.4000/methodos.2343)
Friend, S., 2017, “The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 95, no. 1, pp. 29–42.
Genette, G., 1991, Fiction and Diction, trans. Catherine Porter, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.
Heyd, T., 2006, “Understanding and Handling Unreliable Narratives: A Pragmatic Model and Method”, Semiotica, no. 162, pp. 217–243.
Hintikka, J., 1975, “Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 475–484.
Hintikka, J., 1970a, “Objects of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintance and Public Figures”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67, no. 21, pp. 869–883.
Hintikka, J., 1970b, “The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology”, Synthese, vol. 21, no. 3/4, pp. 408–424.
Hintikka, J., 1967, “Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic”, Noûs, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 33–62. (doi: 10.2307/2214711)
Hintikka, J., 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Hintikka, J. and M. Hintikka, 1989, The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Hintikka, J. and G. Sandu, 1995, “The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference”, Synthese, vol. 104, no. 2, pp. 245–283.
Kripke, S., 2013, Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lecture (Reprint with emendations of six lectures given at Oxford University in 1973), Oxford University Press, New York.
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, D., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, D., 1978, “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, pp. 37–46.
MacDonald, M., 1954, “The Language of Fiction”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary, vol. 27, pp. 165–196.
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Priest, G., 2016, Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Second Edition (First Edition published in 2005), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Rantala, V., 1982a, “Quantified Modal Logic: Non-Normal Worlds and Propositional Attitudes”, Studia Logica, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 41–65.
Rantala, V., 1982b, “Impossible World Semantics and Logical Omniscience”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 35, pp. 106–115.
Searle, J.R., 1975, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, New Literary History, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 319–335.
Thomasson, A.L., 2003, “Fictional Characters and Literary Practices”, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 138–157.
Thomasson, A.L., 1999, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tulenheimo, T., 2017, Objects as Modalities – A Study in the Semantics of Modal Logic, Springer, Dordrecht.
Thomasson, A.L., 2015, “Cross-World Identity, Temporal Quantifiers and the Question of Tensed Contents”, in A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language, Springer,
Dordrecht, pp. 409–461.
Van Inwagen, P., 2000, “Quantification and Fictional Discourse”, in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, CSLI, Stanford, pp. 235–247.
Van Inwagen, P., 1977, “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 299–308.
Voltolini, A., 2012, “Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 4, no. 262, pp. 561–576.
Voltolini, A., 2006, How Ficta Follow Fiction: A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, Springer, Dordrecht.
Walton, K.L., 1990, Mimesis as Make-Believe – On the Foundations of Representational Arts, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Wildman, N. and C. Folde, 2017, “Fiction Unlimited”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 73–80.
Woods, J., 2018, Truth in Fiction – Rethinking Its Logic, Springer, Cham.
Woods, J., 1974, The Logic of Fiction: A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic, Mouton, The Hague.
Woods, J. and J. Isenberg, 2010; “Psychologizing the Semantics of Fiction”, Methodos, vol. 10 https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/2387 [accessed 07 April 2010]. (doi: 10.4000/methodos.2387)
Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Currie, G., 1990, The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Fitting, M. and R. Mendelsohn, 1998, First-Order Modal Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Fontaine, M., 2019, “Hintikka, Free Logician”, Logica Universalis, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 179–201.
Fontaine, M., 2013, Argumentation et engagement ontologique – Être, c’est être choisi, College Publications, London.
Fontaine, M. and S. Rahman, 2014, “Towards a Semantics for the Artifactual Theory of Fiction and Beyond”, Synthese, vol. 191, no. 3, pp. 499–516.
Fontaine, M. and S. Rahman, 2012, “Individuality in Fiction and the Creative Role of the Reader”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 539–560.
Fontaine, M. and S. Rahman, 2010, “Fiction, Creation and Fictionality”, Methodos, vol. 10, https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/2343 [accessed 07 April 2010]. (doi: 10.4000/methodos.2343)
Friend, S., 2017, “The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 95, no. 1, pp. 29–42.
Genette, G., 1991, Fiction and Diction, trans. Catherine Porter, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.
Heyd, T., 2006, “Understanding and Handling Unreliable Narratives: A Pragmatic Model and Method”, Semiotica, no. 162, pp. 217–243.
Hintikka, J., 1975, “Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 475–484.
Hintikka, J., 1970a, “Objects of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintance and Public Figures”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67, no. 21, pp. 869–883.
Hintikka, J., 1970b, “The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology”, Synthese, vol. 21, no. 3/4, pp. 408–424.
Hintikka, J., 1967, “Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic”, Noûs, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 33–62. (doi: 10.2307/2214711)
Hintikka, J., 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Hintikka, J. and M. Hintikka, 1989, The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Hintikka, J. and G. Sandu, 1995, “The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference”, Synthese, vol. 104, no. 2, pp. 245–283.
Kripke, S., 2013, Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lecture (Reprint with emendations of six lectures given at Oxford University in 1973), Oxford University Press, New York.
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, D., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, D., 1978, “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, pp. 37–46.
MacDonald, M., 1954, “The Language of Fiction”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary, vol. 27, pp. 165–196.
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Priest, G., 2016, Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Second Edition (First Edition published in 2005), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Rantala, V., 1982a, “Quantified Modal Logic: Non-Normal Worlds and Propositional Attitudes”, Studia Logica, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 41–65.
Rantala, V., 1982b, “Impossible World Semantics and Logical Omniscience”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 35, pp. 106–115.
Searle, J.R., 1975, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, New Literary History, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 319–335.
Thomasson, A.L., 2003, “Fictional Characters and Literary Practices”, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 138–157.
Thomasson, A.L., 1999, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tulenheimo, T., 2017, Objects as Modalities – A Study in the Semantics of Modal Logic, Springer, Dordrecht.
Thomasson, A.L., 2015, “Cross-World Identity, Temporal Quantifiers and the Question of Tensed Contents”, in A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language, Springer,
Dordrecht, pp. 409–461.
Van Inwagen, P., 2000, “Quantification and Fictional Discourse”, in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, CSLI, Stanford, pp. 235–247.
Van Inwagen, P., 1977, “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 299–308.
Voltolini, A., 2012, “Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 4, no. 262, pp. 561–576.
Voltolini, A., 2006, How Ficta Follow Fiction: A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, Springer, Dordrecht.
Walton, K.L., 1990, Mimesis as Make-Believe – On the Foundations of Representational Arts, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Wildman, N. and C. Folde, 2017, “Fiction Unlimited”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 73–80.
Woods, J., 2018, Truth in Fiction – Rethinking Its Logic, Springer, Cham.
Woods, J., 1974, The Logic of Fiction: A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic, Mouton, The Hague.
Woods, J. and J. Isenberg, 2010; “Psychologizing the Semantics of Fiction”, Methodos, vol. 10 https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/2387 [accessed 07 April 2010]. (doi: 10.4000/methodos.2387)
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