El problema de la representación: ¿razonamientos subrogantes válidos o sólidos?
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En el presente trabajo intentaré poner de manifiesto las debilidades de los argumentos dados por Contessa para sustentar, como fuente del representar, a los razonamientos subrogantes (RS) válidos por sobre los sólidos. En primer lugar, analizo ciertas ventajas epistémicas del criterio sustentado sobre los RS sólidos, evidenciando, consecuentemente, los límites del criterio estipulado por Contessa. En segundo lugar, muestro que los argumentos utilizados por Contessa para descartar el criterio instituido en los RS sólidos son deficientes, ya que, en el mejor de los casos, no demuestran nada y, en el peor de los casos, o bien se comete una falacia por ambigüedad o bien se comete una petición de principio.
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Accorinti, H. L. (2022). El problema de la representación: ¿razonamientos subrogantes válidos o sólidos?. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 54(160), 57–81. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2022.1310
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Bolinska, A., 2013, “Epistemic Representation, Informativeness and the Aim of Faithful Representation”, Synthese, vol. 190, pp. 219–234.
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Bueno, O. y S. French, 2011, “How Theories Represent”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 62, pp. 857–894.
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Cartwright, N., 2010, “Models: Parables vs Fables”, en R. Frigg y M. Hunter, pp. 19–32.
Cartwright, N., 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Carnap, R., 1939, Fundamentos de lógica y matemática, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Chakravartty, A., 2010, “Informational versus Functional Theories of Scientific Representation”, Synthese, vol. 172, no. 2, pp. 197–213.
Contessa, G., 2011, “Scientific Models and Representation”, en S. French y J. Saatsi, pp. 120–137.
Contessa, G., 2007a, The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function, PhD Thesis, University of London.
Contessa, G., 2007b, “Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 74, pp. 48–68.
Contessa, G., 2006, “Scientific Models, Partial Structures and the New Received View of Theories”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 37, pp. 370–377.
Currie, G., 2016, “Models as Fictions, Fictions as Models”, The Monist, vol. 99, pp. 296–310.
da Costa, N. y S. French, 2003, Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
D’Alessandro, W., 2016, “Explicitism about Truth in Fiction”, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 56, pp. 53–65.
Ducheyne, S., 2008, “Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models”, Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics, vol. 9, pp. 119–127.
French, S., 2003, “A Model-Theoretic Account of Representation (or, I don’t Know Much about Art. . . but I Know It Involves Isomorphism)”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70, pp. 1472–1483.
French, S. y J. Saatsi, 2011, The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Bloomsbury Academic, Nueva York.
Frigg, R. y M. Hunter, 2010, Beyond Mimesis and Convention, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer, Dordrecht.
Frigg, R., 2010, “Models and Fiction”, Synthese, vol. 172, pp. 251–268.
Frigg, R., 2002, “Models and Representation: Why Structures Are Not Enough”, Measurement in Physics and Economics, London School of Economics.
Frigg, R. y S. Hartmann, 2006, Models in Science, en Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modelsscience/[fecha de consulta: 27/10/2021].
Frigg, R. y J. Nguyen, 2017, “Models and Representation”, en L. Magnani y T. Bertolotti, pp. 49–102.
Giere, R., 2010, “An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation”, Synthese, vol. 172, pp. 269–281.
Giere, R., 2004, “How Models Are Used to Represent Physical Reality”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, pp. 742–752.
Giere, R., 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Godfrey-Smith, P., 2009, “Models and Fictions in Science”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 143, pp. 101–116.
Ippoliti, E., F. Sterpetti y T. Nickles, 2016, Models and Inferences in Science. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (SAPERE), Springer, Dordrecht.
Knuuttila, T., 2005, “Models, Representation and Mediation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 72, pp. 1260–1271.
Knuuttila, T. y M. Boon, 2011, “How Do Models Give Us Knowledge? The Case of Carnot’s Ideal Heat Engine”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, pp. 309–334.
Magnani L. y T. Bertolotti, 2017, Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science, Springer, Nueva York.
Magnani, L., N. Nersessian y P. Thagard, 1999, Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Springer, Nueva York.
Morgan M. y M. Morrison, 1999, Models as Mediators, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Morrison, M., 2011, “One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 42, pp. 342–351.
Quine, W., 1953, Desde un punto de vista lógico, Hispanoamérica Ediciones, México.
Poznic, M., 2018, “Thin versus Thick Accounts of Scientific Representation”, Synthese, vol. 195, pp. 3422–3451.
Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind. New Series, vol. 14, pp. 479–493.
Saatsi, J., 2016, “Models, Idealisations and Realism”, en E. Ippoliti, F. Sterpetti y T. Nickles, pp. 173–189.
Suárez, M., 2004, “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, pp. 767–779.
Suárez, M., 2003, “Scientific Representation: against Similarity and Isomorphism”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 225–244.
Suárez, M., 1999, “Theories, Models, and Representations”, en L. Magnani, N. Nersessian y P. Thagard, pp. 75–84.
Suárez, M. y A. Solé, 2006, “On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth”, Theoria. Revista de teoría, historia y fundamentos de la ciencia, vol. 55, pp. 39–48.
Suppe, F., 1974, The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
Suppes, P., 2002, Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structure, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
van Fraassen, B., 2008, Scientific Representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
van Fraassen, B., 1980, La imagen científica, Paidós, México.
Swoyer, C., 1991, “Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning”, Synthese, vol. 87, pp. 449–308.
Toon, A., 2010, “Models as Make-Believe”, en R. Frigg y M. Hunter, pp. 71–96.
Weisberg, M., 2013, Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Winsberg, E., 2006, “Models of Success versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth”, Synthese, vol. 152, pp. 1–19.
Boesch, B., 2017, “Scientific Representation”, en Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-repr/ [fecha de consulta: 27/10/2021].
Bolinska, A., 2013, “Epistemic Representation, Informativeness and the Aim of Faithful Representation”, Synthese, vol. 190, pp. 219–234.
Bueno, O., 1997, “Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 585–610.
Bueno, O. y S. French, 2011, “How Theories Represent”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 62, pp. 857–894.
Callender, C. y J. Cohen, 2006, “There Is No Special Problem about Scientific Representation”, Theoria. Revista de teoría, historia y fundamentos de la ciencia, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 67–85.
Cartwright, N., 2010, “Models: Parables vs Fables”, en R. Frigg y M. Hunter, pp. 19–32.
Cartwright, N., 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Carnap, R., 1939, Fundamentos de lógica y matemática, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Chakravartty, A., 2010, “Informational versus Functional Theories of Scientific Representation”, Synthese, vol. 172, no. 2, pp. 197–213.
Contessa, G., 2011, “Scientific Models and Representation”, en S. French y J. Saatsi, pp. 120–137.
Contessa, G., 2007a, The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function, PhD Thesis, University of London.
Contessa, G., 2007b, “Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 74, pp. 48–68.
Contessa, G., 2006, “Scientific Models, Partial Structures and the New Received View of Theories”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 37, pp. 370–377.
Currie, G., 2016, “Models as Fictions, Fictions as Models”, The Monist, vol. 99, pp. 296–310.
da Costa, N. y S. French, 2003, Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
D’Alessandro, W., 2016, “Explicitism about Truth in Fiction”, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 56, pp. 53–65.
Ducheyne, S., 2008, “Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models”, Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics, vol. 9, pp. 119–127.
French, S., 2003, “A Model-Theoretic Account of Representation (or, I don’t Know Much about Art. . . but I Know It Involves Isomorphism)”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 70, pp. 1472–1483.
French, S. y J. Saatsi, 2011, The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Bloomsbury Academic, Nueva York.
Frigg, R. y M. Hunter, 2010, Beyond Mimesis and Convention, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer, Dordrecht.
Frigg, R., 2010, “Models and Fiction”, Synthese, vol. 172, pp. 251–268.
Frigg, R., 2002, “Models and Representation: Why Structures Are Not Enough”, Measurement in Physics and Economics, London School of Economics.
Frigg, R. y S. Hartmann, 2006, Models in Science, en Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modelsscience/[fecha de consulta: 27/10/2021].
Frigg, R. y J. Nguyen, 2017, “Models and Representation”, en L. Magnani y T. Bertolotti, pp. 49–102.
Giere, R., 2010, “An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation”, Synthese, vol. 172, pp. 269–281.
Giere, R., 2004, “How Models Are Used to Represent Physical Reality”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, pp. 742–752.
Giere, R., 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Godfrey-Smith, P., 2009, “Models and Fictions in Science”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 143, pp. 101–116.
Ippoliti, E., F. Sterpetti y T. Nickles, 2016, Models and Inferences in Science. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (SAPERE), Springer, Dordrecht.
Knuuttila, T., 2005, “Models, Representation and Mediation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 72, pp. 1260–1271.
Knuuttila, T. y M. Boon, 2011, “How Do Models Give Us Knowledge? The Case of Carnot’s Ideal Heat Engine”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, pp. 309–334.
Magnani L. y T. Bertolotti, 2017, Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science, Springer, Nueva York.
Magnani, L., N. Nersessian y P. Thagard, 1999, Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Springer, Nueva York.
Morgan M. y M. Morrison, 1999, Models as Mediators, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Morrison, M., 2011, “One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 42, pp. 342–351.
Quine, W., 1953, Desde un punto de vista lógico, Hispanoamérica Ediciones, México.
Poznic, M., 2018, “Thin versus Thick Accounts of Scientific Representation”, Synthese, vol. 195, pp. 3422–3451.
Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind. New Series, vol. 14, pp. 479–493.
Saatsi, J., 2016, “Models, Idealisations and Realism”, en E. Ippoliti, F. Sterpetti y T. Nickles, pp. 173–189.
Suárez, M., 2004, “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, pp. 767–779.
Suárez, M., 2003, “Scientific Representation: against Similarity and Isomorphism”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 225–244.
Suárez, M., 1999, “Theories, Models, and Representations”, en L. Magnani, N. Nersessian y P. Thagard, pp. 75–84.
Suárez, M. y A. Solé, 2006, “On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth”, Theoria. Revista de teoría, historia y fundamentos de la ciencia, vol. 55, pp. 39–48.
Suppe, F., 1974, The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
Suppes, P., 2002, Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structure, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
van Fraassen, B., 2008, Scientific Representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
van Fraassen, B., 1980, La imagen científica, Paidós, México.
Swoyer, C., 1991, “Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning”, Synthese, vol. 87, pp. 449–308.
Toon, A., 2010, “Models as Make-Believe”, en R. Frigg y M. Hunter, pp. 71–96.
Weisberg, M., 2013, Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Winsberg, E., 2006, “Models of Success versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth”, Synthese, vol. 152, pp. 1–19.
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