Two Senses of ‘Essence’ and a Straw Man
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Abstract
In this paper, I distinguish two senses of the word ‘essence’ both of which figure prominently in recent analytic metaphysics. To disambiguate, I adopt the terminology of ‘modal essence’ (for how a thing metaphysically must be) and ‘whatness essence’ (for what a thing is). With the help of this terminology, I address Kit Fine’s charge that modal metaphysics in the framework of Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity proffers an incorrect conceptual analysis of whatness essence. I show that the charge is baseless, and thus that there is no justification for Fine’s verdict that the Kripkean conception of metaphysics should be given up.
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