Ruffino on the Contingent A Priori
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Abstract
This is a rejoinder of sorts to Marco Ruffino’s critique in his book Contingent A Priori Truths (Springer, Switzerland, 2022) of my own criticism of Saul Kripke’s case for the contingent a priori. A distinction is drawn between knowledge concerning the meter stick S that its length is such-and-such and knowledge concerning S’s length that it is such-and-such.
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References
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Donnellan, Keith, 1987, “How to Measure the Standard Metre” , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. 88, pp. 193–217. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545080 reprinted in Nathan Salmon 2007.
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