A Pragmatist Version of the Concept of Moral Responsibility
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Abstract
This paper aims to defend a possible use of the concept of responsibility in moral philosophy —which is linked to the idea of free will— disregarding the deterministic and indeterministic character of human action. Thus, following P.F. Strawson, a pragmatist interpretation of the concept of moral responsibility is proposed, which is based on the fact that normally human beings act morally in making ascriptions of responsibility. Here, I defend that the metaphysical debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism is vicarious from a practical point of view, and some arguments are offered to sustain a theory of moral responsibility as something rational to defend in the light of our daily moral practices.
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