Acerca de las capacidades

Abstract

Austin considers that there is some plausibility in Moore’s analysis according to which ‘I can do x’ means ‘I shall succeed in doing x, if I try’ and ‘I could have done x’ means ‘I should have succeeded in doing x, if I had tried!’1 However, Austin objects to this analysis because there is no logical contradiction between the statements that someone failed and that he has the capacity to succeed. Another objectionable conclusion from that analysis is that it leads to the conclusion that there is a logical contradiction between the statements that someone did not succeed in a performance and that he does not have the corresponding capacity in spite of the fact that there are situations in which we make these statements. In the present paper I shall argue that the acceptance of the previous analysis following the recommendations of the empiricist theory of meaning limits the explicative and predictive possibilities of the language. We shall not develop our position about capacities which avoids these difficulties for this is done in a book on dispositions which is at present in preparation. We shall only indicate here that our work includes a realist position about these properties.
Let us begin by examining examples of successes in a performance without having the corresponding capacity. An example of this type would be presented by a doctor healing the hand of a patient who tells him that in spite of the fact that he moves his hand, still he has not recuperated his capacity in all circumstances.
Naturally an action is regarded as a success when it has been performed holding in mind a purpose whose efficiency for bringing about the intended result is evaluated favorably. Since a capacity may be manifested in a variety of circumstances some of which are more adequate than others to confirm it, successes not associated with the capacity normally confirmed by them would be instances in which there are other reasons to disconfirm that the person has the capacity or to confirm that he has a reduced capacity. We stated that successes not associated with a capacity can be found in less favorable circumstances for the confirmation of the capacity, or in which there are other reasons to conclude that the capacity is not possessed by the person.
Our previous observations warrant the conclusion that the induction of a capacity based on successes is not a logical inference; in some cases this conclusion requires the examination of a variety of circumstances. When a success is not associated with the capacity normally confirmed by them, we may suppose that there are other evidences to confirm that the person does not possess that capacity. It was stated that capacities may be manifested in different circumstances, some of which are less favorable than others to confirm them; it may be assumed that successes not associated with the usual capacity may be found in less favorable circumstances for the confirmation, though, in other cases may be found when there is evidence which might confirm a different capacity of the person.
Our previous observations clarify the existence of examples of successes not associated with a capacity, as well as Austin’s examples of capacities without successes. They are non-standard because, since successes are evidence for the capacities, it is not standard to state that we have evidence for a capacity without it. There are other examples of successes in which we exclude that they are manifestation of a capacity; as when we attribute them to good luck or God’s intervention.
Austin’s observation that a capacity is compatible with the existence of failures can be understood within the same framework because a failure confirms the statement denying that someone has a capacity, but this evidence may not be sufficient to refute that the person has that capacity.
Even if the previous examples are not usual, their usefulness lies in the fact that they avoid the temptation of supposing that the relationship between highly confirmed nomological statements is a logical relationship.
One of the reasons for a choice among candidates by a teacher or a person employing personnel may be a comparison between the capacities of the applicants which justify the selection of the more capable candidates because in their case success in the performance of his future task is predictable. However, if terms applied to capacities were substituted by the analysans, the comparison between the capacities of the candidates would have to be substituted by a weak analogical argument between different actions, circumstances and activities which would involve a loss of the explicative and predictive powers of the language.