Epistemology, Psychology and Scientific Change

Abstract

Criticism of psychologism in the foundations of logic and mathematics seems to be the main source of the negative attitude of many philosophers towards the use of psychology in the analysis of epistemological problems. The purpose of this article is to show that if epistemology is not unduly restricted to the problem of justification, psychology may contribute to the analysis of epistemological problems in general. The example taken here to illustrate this thesis is the problem of the changes in the nature of scientific knowledge.

The first part of the article deals with the empiricist answer to the question of how knowledge changes. The empiricists maintain that this change is due essentially to a factor allegedly independent of theories: experience. All the different kinds of empiricism share the tenet that experience is independent of theories.

Later on, the position of Hanson and Kuhn, who reject this tenet of empiricism, is described, and we find that when they try to explain scientific change, they are confronted with a serious problem. For instance, Kuhn maintains that the scientist’s perception of his own field is dominated by the “paradigm” which he espouses, but on the other hand the change of paradigms is determined by the perception of “anomalies” conceived as clashes between the paradigm and experience. But how is the perception of anomalies possible if the perception is dominated by the paradigm?

Kuhn answers that the development of the theory and its precise application to the facts allow for the detection of anomalies, even though this is not the aim of the theory. This answer is interesting but insufficient. It only expresses one of the conditions necessary for the perception of anomalies. Other necessary conditions must be found in the psychological mechanisms of scientific change.

In the second part of the article, Neisser’s conceptual framework for the study of perception is described. Neisser makes the distinction, in the process of perception, between preattentive mechanisms and focal attention mechanisms. Furthermore, he postulates the existence of “background processes” (space, time, and concepts) to which the perceived objects are referred. Neisser’s conceptual framework also postulates a “deep” action of cognition, operating at unconscious levels. The introduction of this framework makes the anti-empiricist thesis plausible. Some theoretical elements are filtered out in perception, even against the conscious will of the scientist. But Neisser’s explanation alone cannot solve the problem, because it postulates mere collaboration of the unconscious with respect to the conscious. 1£the unconscious is dominated by the conscious, and this in turn by the paradigm, any rupture with the paradigm would be psychologically impossible.

At this point, the Freudian conceptualization of the “psychic apparatus” is introduced. Freud rejects any deep action of cognition and conceives the relation between the unconscious and the conscious as a conflict. The author of this article propounds a third conceptualization in which the deep action of cognition is admitted but the collaboration of the conscious and the unconscious is rejected.

Although the scientist’s mind is dominated by a paradigm, a conflict is always possible. This allows for a solution of the paradox aroused by Kuhn’s paradigm. Although it is true that perception is deeply influenced by the paradigm, there are always anti-paradigmatic tendencies.

[Summary by Oscar Nudler]