Confusiones axiológicas

Abstract

The aim of this article is the examination of two confusions which constitute serious epistemological obstacles for the development of the philosophy of value.

The first of these two confusions is that between semantical questions, such as: What does it mean (or what is the sense of) an expression having the form 'X is good'?, and the so called genetic-causal questions concerning when, where, what for or why expressions of the form 'X is good' are stated. If one does not make a distinction between these two kinds of questions one can easily fall into a genetic-causal fallacy.

Subjectivistic hedonism falls into such a confusion. It doesn't distinguish between two different sorts of facts: the fact that something is considered to have a certain value because it has as a result an experience of pleasure, and the semantical, and completely different fact, that an assertion about the value of something is equivalent to an assertion about experiences of pleasure. This same confusion also appears in some other subjectivistic views, even if they are so clearly stated and variegated as it is the case with Perry's theory.

It is easy to upset such a view by applying the open question argument. In fact it is possible to predicate 'good' of the definiens itself without any danger of redundance. In addition, one should notice here that when 'pleasure' is taken as an empirical-psychological term, it cannot be used to perform the function of praise and prescription that is usually performed by the language of value.

Some other reductive attempts are also objectionable on the same basis, for example, those coming from the theory of psychoanalysis and the marxist theory of ideology. To accept that all moral, juridical and aesthetic statements (and in general all evaluative expressions) reflect inner drives and serve interests of a social class, does not compel us to reduce the connexions of meaning given between value judgements to relations which depict peculiar psychosocial articulations. One should also notice, on the other hand, that if there were not a semantical element different from the descriptive one —either psychological or social— it would be impossible to use value expressions to justify interests or to cover inner drives as it is postulated by the theories we are critizising here.

A quite modern version of this confusion —which is being fed by the most recent linguistic trends— consists in assuming that the evaluative sense of a value expression may be identified with its use. Against this thesis one must emphasize the difference between use and sense, without any danger of having to reject the idea that the sense of an expression is rooted in its use. It is true that two uses may by different not only because they operate with different semantical elements, but it is also true that they could not possibly be so if there wouldn't be any difference between these semantical elements. Therefore, it is necessary that there should be peculiar kinds of meaning which are properly evaluative. When this distinction is not respected one falls into a genetic-causal fallacy.

The next step in this paper is an examination of the confusion between questions concerning the foundations (or rational justification) of an expression, and semantical questions. The former are directed towards the reasons upon which statements of any kind, and in this particular case statements of the form 'X is good', are grounded.

There are mainly two versions of this confusion. The first one occurs when they try to reduce questions concerning the sense of the language of value to questions about the reasons that may be adduced in order to validate statements of value. The second confusion consists in reducing questions concerning the foundations of value expressions to semantic questions. The former kind of confusion may be illustrated by some opinions expressed by S. Hampshire when he examines some typical moral fallacies. In Hampshire's argumentation, questions concerning the sense of an expression almost resolve into questions concerning the reasons for the use of an expression. This makes possible an almost complete identification between the meaningful components of an expression and the grounds for its validation. In order to upset this view one should notice here: I) that the concept of validation is theoretically distinguishable from the concept of sense, and this can be shown by the fact that some axiological theories accept the former and reject the latter; and 2) that when this identification is analysed, it appears like a version of the verification theory of meaning and therefore, all the well known arguments against the latter are also applicable against the former. To accept this reduction would imply the necessity of supporting the idea that when somebody makes a value judgement he knows that the statement he is formulating is right or wrong, or at least that he has a means of knowing this. Under this supposition, if someone has any doubts about the reasons on which his statement is grounded, he would actually have doubts about what he is saying. Obviously all this is not true.

The second form of the confusion we are considering here, is analysed on the basis of the possible distinction between a theological thesis concerning the grounds on which morality is justified, and a thesis concerning the meaning of moral expressions. It is pointed out, in addition, that the identification in question is not required not even in the case of a reductionist thesis like, e.g. Spencer's naturalism.

Finally, the independence of both questions is required for the purpose of evaluation at the level of ordinary evaluations, which are usually derivative. It is because there are no established patterns of appraisal in protoevaluations that the subject which makes a value judgement can only make appeal to his own spiritual resources. In such a situation, he knows what his language means when he attributes value to something, but he does not necessarily knows how or on which grounds he will succeed in making valid for everyone the assertions by means of which he expresses his appreciations.

Once the above mentioned objections are accepted, one may reject two of the confusions which have affected the axiological theory Semantical questions, causal-genetic questions and questions concerning the foundations, have to do with theoretical difficulties (aporia) which are perfectly defined or else can be easily defined by means of a conceptual analysis, and this has an important consequence concerning the explicative import of axiological theories. As long as the determination of boundaries does not occur, one could expect to attack with success all axiological problems by means of a single kind of theory. If this way of proceeding is not the cause of additional difficulties, it blocks at least the possibility of stating adequately the axiological problems and so of finding a thorough solution to them. It is clear now that sometimes, not always, the diversity of questions demands different theoretical approaches.