¿Por qué una palabra significa lo que significa? Comentarios a Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos de Sílvio Mota Pinto
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Abstract
In this brief commentary, I argue that Mota Pinto’s theory of interpretation (2009) predicts meanings where there are none. I also criticize his presentation of the communal perspective on meaning, drawing a distinction between two different kinds of semantic facts: a word meaning what it does rather than meaning something else, and such word meaning what it does rather than not meaning anything at all.
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How to Cite
Barceló Aspeitia, A. A. (2018). ¿Por qué una palabra significa lo que significa? Comentarios a Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos de Sílvio Mota Pinto. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 43(127), 59–66. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.852
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