The Philosophical Significance of the Representational Theory of Measurement —RTM as Semantic Foundations
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La Teoría Representacional de la Medición (RTM, por sus siglas en inglés), especialmente la canónica obra en tres volúmenes Los fundamentos de la medición de Krantz et al., es un logro histórico en nuestra comprensión de la medición. A pesar de esto, no ha sido nada fácil determinar qué podemos aprender exactamente de RTM acerca de la medición y quién debería ser el público objetivo de los resultados formales de RTM. ¿En qué sentido RTM proporciona fundamentos de la medición y cuál es el significado filosófico de tales fundamentos? Argumento que RTM proporciona fundamentos semánticos de la medición, y que su significado filosófico radica en un cambio hacia la representación estructural.
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