El problema de la fundamentalidad para el panpsiquismo

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Esteban Ortiz Medina
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3303-7614

Resumen

En esta investigación desarrollo en detalle el problema de la fundamentalidad para el panpsiquismo. Sostengo que, a la luz de tres problemas típicos y recurrentes atribuidos al panpsiquismo en la literatura, la noción de fundamentalidad, esencial para la definición de la teoría, resulta altamente problemática. Luego, examino dos problemas de indecidibilidad que se derivan de dicha noción: primero, la imposibilidad de diferenciar internamente entre distintas versiones del panpsiquismo, y segundo, la dificultad de distinguir externamente entre el panpsiquismo, el dualismo y el fisicalismo. Concluyo con un comentario sobre el estatus modal del panpsiquismo, planteando dudas sobre su viabilidad y coherencia.

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Ortiz Medina, E. (2025). El problema de la fundamentalidad para el panpsiquismo. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 57(169), 59–85. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1649

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