A Criterion of Literality for Names
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En los últimos años, varios tipos de usos no referenciales de los nombres han recibido atención en la semántica. Sin embargo, la falta de una base con principios claros para trazar la distinción entre los usos que una teoría semántica de los nombres debe explicar (los usos “literales”) y aquellos que no necesita explicar por sí misma (los usos “no literales”) constituye una deficiencia importante en el debate. Una objeción destacada —el “Desafío del Escéptico”— en contra de las teorías semánticas que tratan los usos predicativos como literales ejemplifica el tipo de problema que puede derivarse de dicha deficiencia. Este artículo propone una manera general de trazar la línea entre los usos literales y los no literales de los nombres. Además, al ofrecer una justificación para tratar los usos predicativos como literales, también proporciona una respuesta al Desafío del Escéptico.
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