Causalism: A Framework for Moral Responsibility
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Este ensayo se basa en las conferencias Gaos impartidas en la UNAM en marzo de 2025. El tema general son los fundamentos metafísicos de la responsabilidad moral, tanto en su forma básica como no básica. Motiva el causalismo como un marco general desde el cual entender ambas formas de responsabilidad.
Consta de dos partes. El enfoque de la primera parte es la responsabilidad básica—en particular, la condición metafísica para esa forma de responsabilidad: la acción libre. Motiva una concepción causalista y compatibilista de la acción libre como una extensión de la teoría causalista dominante de la acción. El enfoque de la segunda parte es la responsabilidad no básica: la responsabilidad por los resultados en el mundo. Motiva una concepción de las condiciones bajo las cuales la responsabilidad por los resultados resulta de la responsabilidad por acciones, una que funciona como una extensión de la teoría causalista de la acción libre.
Algunos de los puntos destacados del artículo son los siguientes. Ofrece una teoría exhaustiva y unificada de la responsabilidad moral. Destaca el papel que desempeñan conceptos metafísicos claves (como la causalidad, la fundamentación y los poderes) en una teoría de la responsabilidad moral. Finalmente, aborda cuestiones metodológicas sutiles que surgen al tratar con una mezcla de juicios morales y metafísicos.
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