An Inferential Account on Theoretical Concepts in Physics

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Javier Anta

Resumen

En este artículo desarrollaré una propuesta inferencial acerca del sentido y referencia de conceptos en física, basada principalmente en la noción pragmática de “validez inferencial”. Primero, distinguiremos entre sentido empírico y significado teórico como dos modalidades diferentes del sentido, donde el primero depende de la codificación consistente de valores experimentales, en la línea de Chang (2004), y el segundo en la coherencia semántica con otros conceptos. Además, argumentaremos que estas distintas contribuciones a la validez de las inferencias conllevan mecanismos de fijación referencial causales y representacionales-descriptivos, respectivamente. Finalmente, nos basaremos en los conceptos de entropía como caso de estudio de nuestra propuesta.

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Cómo citar
Anta, J. (2020). An Inferential Account on Theoretical Concepts in Physics. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(156), 59–85. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1223
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Artículos

Citas

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