An Inferential Account on Theoretical Concepts in Physics
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Abstract
In this paper we develop an inferential account on the meaning and reference of theoretical concepts in physics, mainly based on the pragmatic notion of ‘inferential validity’. Firstly, we distinguish between empirical meaningfulness and theoretical significance as two different modes of meaning, wherein the former depends on consistently encoding experimental values, as proposed by Chang (2004), and the latter on being semantically coherent with other concepts. Secondly, we argue that each of these contributions to the validity of inferences imports a causal and representational mechanism of reference-fixing, respectively. Finally, we will rely on entropy concepts as our case study.
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How to Cite
Anta, J. (2020). An Inferential Account on Theoretical Concepts in Physics. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 52(156), 59–85. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1223
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References
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Hoefer, C., and G. Martí, 2020, “Realism, Reference and Perspective”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 10, no. 38.
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Peacocke, C., 1992, A Study of Concepts, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Psillos, S., 2012, “Causal Descriptivism and the Reference of Theoretical Terms”, in Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer (eds.), Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Shapere, D., 1985, “Reason and the Search for Knowledge”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 310–312.
Sklar, L., 1993, Physics and Chance: Philosophical Issues in the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Suárez, M., 2004, “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, no. 5, pp. 767–779.
Suárez, M. and F. Pero, 2019, “The Representational Semantic Conception”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 344–365.
Wallace, D., 2012, “The Necessity of Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics”, PhilSci archive. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15290/ [date of last consultation: 15/09/2020]
Wicken, J.S., 1987, “Entropy and Information: Suggestions for Common Language”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 176–193.
Wilson, M., 2006, Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Zhong, L., 2015, “Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 94, no. 3.
Arabatzis, T., 1995, The Electron: A Biographical Sketch of a Theoretical Entity, Dissertation, Princeton University.
Bartels, A., 2010, “Explaining Referential Stability of Physics Concepts: The Semantic Embedding Approach”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science/Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 267–281.
Ben-Naim, A., 2008, A Farewell to Entropy. Statistical Thermodynamics Based on Information, World Scientific, Singapore.
Brandom, R., 2000, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, Harvard University Press, Harvard.
Bridgman, P.W., 1927, The Logic of Modern Physics, Macmillan, New York.
Callender, C., 1999, “Reducing Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics: The Case of Entropy”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, no. 7, pp. 348–373.
Carnap, R., 1966, Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Basic Books, New York.
Chang, H., 2019, “Operationalism”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/operationa lism/ [date of last consultation: 15/09/2020].
Chang, H., 2004, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress, Oxford University Press, USA.
Frigg, R. and C. Werndl, 2011, “Entropy – A Guide for the Perplexed”, in Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 115–142.
Hoefer, C., and G. Martí, 2020, “Realism, Reference and Perspective”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 10, no. 38.
Kindi, V. and T. Arabatzis, 2008, “The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of Science”, in Stella Vosniadou (ed.), Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, Routledge, London.
Kroon, F.W., 1987, “Causal Descriptivism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 1–17. (doi:10.1080/00048408712342731)
Nersessian, N., 2008, Creating Scientific Concepts, MIT Press, Mass.
Nola, R., 1980, “Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 505–531. (doi: 10.1086/288954)
Peacocke, C., 1992, A Study of Concepts, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Psillos, S., 2012, “Causal Descriptivism and the Reference of Theoretical Terms”, in Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer (eds.), Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Shapere, D., 1985, “Reason and the Search for Knowledge”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 310–312.
Sklar, L., 1993, Physics and Chance: Philosophical Issues in the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Suárez, M., 2004, “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, no. 5, pp. 767–779.
Suárez, M. and F. Pero, 2019, “The Representational Semantic Conception”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 344–365.
Wallace, D., 2012, “The Necessity of Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics”, PhilSci archive. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15290/ [date of last consultation: 15/09/2020]
Wicken, J.S., 1987, “Entropy and Information: Suggestions for Common Language”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 176–193.
Wilson, M., 2006, Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Zhong, L., 2015, “Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 94, no. 3.
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