Humor as Harm to Intentional Subjects
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Abstract
In this article, I present, clarify and explore some potential virtues of a particular theory —of an intentional character— about comicity. Its principal minimal thesis posits a necessary condition for comicity: the thinker who appraises a situation as comic recognizes a hurt or damage against certain intentional subjects (they may be subjects involved in the comic situation, or the appraiser himself). A stronger version claims that comicity proceeds (partially, at least) from that hurt; it is the hurt itself that, when combined with other factors, we find comic. The task of clarifying the theory involves to compare it with other views on humor, in particular the incongruity theory.
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References
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