Reply to Sebastián: in Defense of the Conscious Nature of First-Person Beliefs
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Abstract
In this journal, I argued for the conscious nature of first-person beliefs (2014). In a more recent paper, Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2017) tried to show that such an argument is unsound. Here I address his three core criticisms. Firstly, I maintain that my argument is valid if to know a first-person belief consists in believing one has it. Likewise, I defend that no damaging infinite regression of conscious higher-order beliefs is involved. Further, I argue that the notion of consciousness at stake is the relevant notion for discussion about the nature of consciousness and the unconscious. Finally, I examine the justification for the principle (SC*) in order to show that it does not beg the question.
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How to Cite
Vidal, J. (2018). Reply to Sebastián: in Defense of the Conscious Nature of First-Person Beliefs. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 50(150), 65–89. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.16
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References
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Block, N., 2001, “Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness”, Cognition, vol. 79, nos. 1–2, pp. 197–219.
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no. 2, pp. 1–12.
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Rosenthal, D.M., 1991, “The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality”, en E. Villanueva (comp.), Consciousness: Philosophical Issues I, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, California, pp. 15–36; reimpreso en Rosenthal 2005, pp. 135–148 (a cuya paginación remito en este texto).
Rosenthal, D.M., 1986, “Two Concepts of Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 329–349; reimpreso en Rosenthal 2005, pp. 21–45 (a cuya paginación remito en este texto).
Sebastián, M.A., 2018, “Drop It Like It’s HOT: a Vicious Regress for Higher-Order Thought Theories”, Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098–018–1078–7.
Sebastián, M.A., 2017, “Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo”, Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 49, no. 146, pp. 37–60.
Shoemaker, S., 2009, “Self-Intimation and Second-Order Belief”, Erkenntnis, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 35–51.
Tye, M., 2003, Consciousness and Persons, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Vidal, J., 2014, “Creencia de primera persona, conciencia y la paradoja de Eroom”, Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 46, no. 138, pp. 37–64.
Block, N., 2007, “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 481–499 y 530–548.
Block, N., 2001, “Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness”, Cognition, vol. 79, nos. 1–2, pp. 197–219.
Block, N., 1997, “Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 159–166.
Brown, R. y P. Mandik, 2012, “On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, or: What Is It Like to Think that One Thinks that P?”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 40,
no. 2, pp. 1–12.
Brownstein, M. y J. Saul (comps.), 2016, Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Chalmers, D., 1997, “Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 148–149.
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dehaene, S. y I. Naccache, 2001, “Towards Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework”, Cognition, vol. 79, nos. 1–2, pp. 1–37.
Gertler, B., 2011, “Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief”, en A. Hatzimoysis (comp.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 125–145.
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. [Versión en castellano: El nombrar y la necesidad, 2a. ed. rev., trad. Margarita M. Valdés, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-
UNAM, 2005.]
Lycan, W.G., 1986, “Tacit Belief”, en R.J. Bogdan (comp.), Belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 61–82.
Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, en Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215–271.
Rosenthal, D.M., 2005, Consciousness and Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rosenthal, D.M., 2002, “How Many Kinds of Consciousness?”, Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 11, pp. 653–665.
Rosenthal, D.M., 2001, “Introspection and Self-Interpretation”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 201–233; reimpreso en Rosenthal 2005, pp. 103–131 (a cuya paginación remito en este texto).
Rosenthal, D.M., 1999, “Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 26, no. 1–2, pp. 321–350; reimpreso en Rosenthal 2005, pp. 149–174 (a cuya paginación remito en este texto).
Rosenthal, D.M., 1997, “A Theory of Consciousness”, en N. Block, O. Flanagan y G. Güzeldere (comps.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 729–753.
Rosenthal, D.M., 1991, “The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality”, en E. Villanueva (comp.), Consciousness: Philosophical Issues I, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, California, pp. 15–36; reimpreso en Rosenthal 2005, pp. 135–148 (a cuya paginación remito en este texto).
Rosenthal, D.M., 1986, “Two Concepts of Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 329–349; reimpreso en Rosenthal 2005, pp. 21–45 (a cuya paginación remito en este texto).
Sebastián, M.A., 2018, “Drop It Like It’s HOT: a Vicious Regress for Higher-Order Thought Theories”, Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098–018–1078–7.
Sebastián, M.A., 2017, “Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo”, Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 49, no. 146, pp. 37–60.
Shoemaker, S., 2009, “Self-Intimation and Second-Order Belief”, Erkenntnis, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 35–51.
Tye, M., 2003, Consciousness and Persons, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Vidal, J., 2014, “Creencia de primera persona, conciencia y la paradoja de Eroom”, Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 46, no. 138, pp. 37–64.
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