Relativismo de múltiples índices sobre predicados de gusto
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Resumen
Centrando la atención en los predicados de gusto, este artículo propone una nueva versión de relativismo, cuya motivación es un fenómeno que se ha discutido recientemente: la pluralidad de perspectivas. Tras mostrar que este fenómeno es problemático para algunas versiones de relativismo y discutir posibles respuestas que el relativista podría ofrecer, presento mi propia versión. La principal característica de la propuesta es la introducción en el índice, no de un único parámetro para perspectivas, sino de una secuencia (posiblemente infinita) de tales parámetros. En la última sección del artículo defiendo esta propuesta de tres objeciones.
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Zeman, D. (2019). Relativismo de múltiples índices sobre predicados de gusto. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 51(151), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.01
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Torre, S., 2010, “Centered Assertion”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 150, no. x, pp. 97–114.
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Weber, C., 2013, “Centered Communication”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, supplement 1, pp. 205–223.
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Zeman, D., 2015, “Relativism and Bound Predicates of Personal Taste: An Answer to Schaffer’s Argument from Binding”, Dialectica, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 155–183.
Cappelen, H. and J. Dever, 2014, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cappelen, H. and J. Hawthorne, 2009, Relativism and Monadic Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cresswell, M., 1990, Entities and Indices, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Cresswell, M., 1973, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London.
Egan, A., J. Hawthorne, and B. Weatherson, 2005, “Epistemic Modals in Context”, in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 131–169.
Glanzberg, M., 2007, “Context, Content, and Relativism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 136, no. 1, pp. 1–29.
Heim, I. and A. Kratzer, 1998, Semantics in Generative Grammar, Blackwell, Oxford.
Kamp, H., 1971, “Formal Properties of ‘Now’ ”, Theoria, vol. 37, pp. 227–274.
Kaplan, D., 1989, “Demonstratives”, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 481– 563.
Kindermann, D., 2019, “Coordinating Perspectives: De Se and Taste Attitudes in Communication”, Inquiry, vol. 62, no. 8, pp. 912–955.
Kissine, M., 2012, “From Contexts to Circumstances of Evaluation: Is the Trade-off Always Innocuous?”, Synthese, vol. 184, no. 2, pp. 199–216.
Kneer, M., 2015, Perspective in Language, PhD thesis, EHESS.
Kneer, M., A. Vicente, and D. Zeman, 2017, “Relativism about Predicates of Personal Taste and Perspectival Plurality”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 37–60.
Kölbel, M., 2009, “The Evidence for Relativism”, Synthese, vol. 166, no. 2, pp. 375–394.
Kölbel, M., 2004a, “Faultless Disagreement”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 104, no. 1, pp. 53–73.
Kölbel, M., 2004b, “Indexical Relativism vs. Genuine Relativism”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 297–313. Lasersohn, P., 2016, Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kölbel, M., 2009, “Relative Truth, Speaker Commitment, and Control of Implicit Arguments”, Synthese, vol. 166, no. 2, pp. 359–374.
Kölbel, M., 2008, “Quantification and Perspective in Relativist Semantics”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 305–337.
Kölbel, M., 2005, “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 6, pp. 643–686.
Lewis, D., 1980, “Index, Context, and Content”, in S. Kanger and S. Ohman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 79–100.
Lewis, D., 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, vol. 88, pp. 513–543.
MacFarlane, J., 2014, Assessment-Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ninan, D., 2010, De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication, Philosophy Compass, vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 551–567.
Rabern, B., 2012, “Propositions and Multiple Indexing”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 116–124.
Rabern, B. and D. Ball, 2019, “Monsters and the Theoretical Role of Context”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XCVIII, no. 2, pp. 392–416.
Recanati, F., 2007, Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rey, D., 2016, In Defense of Implicit Times, PhD thesis, University of Barcelona http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/398833 [retrieved: 31/03/2019].
Richard, M., 2004, “Contextualism and Relativism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 119, no. 1–2, pp. 215–242.
Roeper, T., 2016, “Propositions and Implicit Arguments Carry a Default General Point of View. Acquisition Evidence against Relativism and Subjectivity”, in C. Meier and J. van Wijnbergen-Huitink (eds.), Subjective Meaning: Alternatives to Relativism, De Gruyter, Germany, pp. 210– 226.
Snyder, E., 2013, “Binding, Genericity, and Predicates of Personal Taste”, Inquiry, vol. 56, no. 2–3, pp. 278–306.
Stalnaker, R., 1981, “Indexical Belief”, Synthese, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 129– 149.
Stephenson, T., 2007, “Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predi- cates of Personal Taste”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 30, no. X, pp. 487–525.
Stojanovic, I., 2012, “The Problem of De Se Assertion”, Erkenntnis, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 49–58.
Torre, S., 2010, “Centered Assertion”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 150, no. x, pp. 97–114.
Vlach, F., 1973, “Now” and “Then”: A Formal Study in the Logic of Tense Anaphora, PhD thesis, UCLA.
Weber, C., 2013, “Centered Communication”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, supplement 1, pp. 205–223.
Zeman, D., 2018, “Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Index- ing”, in R. Truswell, C. Cummins, C. Heycock, B. Rabern and H. Rohde (eds.), https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DRjNjViN/Zeman.pdf Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21, vol. 2, pp. 1353–1370.
Zeman, D., 2015, “Relativism and Bound Predicates of Personal Taste: An Answer to Schaffer’s Argument from Binding”, Dialectica, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 155–183.
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