Multiple Indexing Relativism about Predicates of Taste
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Abstract
Focusing on predicates of taste, this paper puts forward a novel version of relativism, motivated by a recently discussed phenomenon: perspectival plurality. After showing that the phenomenon is problematic for at least some versions of relativism and discussing several possible answers on behalf of the relativist, I put forward my own version. The main feature of the proposal is the introduction in the index not of a single parameter for perspectives, but of a (possibly infinite) sequence of such parameters. In the last part of the paper, I defend the view against three objections.
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Zeman, D. (2019). Multiple Indexing Relativism about Predicates of Taste. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 51(151), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.01
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References
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Stalnaker, R., 1981, “Indexical Belief”, Synthese, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 129– 149.
Stephenson, T., 2007, “Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predi- cates of Personal Taste”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 30, no. X, pp. 487–525.
Stojanovic, I., 2012, “The Problem of De Se Assertion”, Erkenntnis, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 49–58.
Torre, S., 2010, “Centered Assertion”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 150, no. x, pp. 97–114.
Vlach, F., 1973, “Now” and “Then”: A Formal Study in the Logic of Tense Anaphora, PhD thesis, UCLA.
Weber, C., 2013, “Centered Communication”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, supplement 1, pp. 205–223.
Zeman, D., 2018, “Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Index- ing”, in R. Truswell, C. Cummins, C. Heycock, B. Rabern and H. Rohde (eds.), https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DRjNjViN/Zeman.pdf Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21, vol. 2, pp. 1353–1370.
Zeman, D., 2015, “Relativism and Bound Predicates of Personal Taste: An Answer to Schaffer’s Argument from Binding”, Dialectica, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 155–183.
Cappelen, H. and J. Dever, 2014, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cappelen, H. and J. Hawthorne, 2009, Relativism and Monadic Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cresswell, M., 1990, Entities and Indices, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Cresswell, M., 1973, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London.
Egan, A., J. Hawthorne, and B. Weatherson, 2005, “Epistemic Modals in Context”, in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 131–169.
Glanzberg, M., 2007, “Context, Content, and Relativism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 136, no. 1, pp. 1–29.
Heim, I. and A. Kratzer, 1998, Semantics in Generative Grammar, Blackwell, Oxford.
Kamp, H., 1971, “Formal Properties of ‘Now’ ”, Theoria, vol. 37, pp. 227–274.
Kaplan, D., 1989, “Demonstratives”, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 481– 563.
Kindermann, D., 2019, “Coordinating Perspectives: De Se and Taste Attitudes in Communication”, Inquiry, vol. 62, no. 8, pp. 912–955.
Kissine, M., 2012, “From Contexts to Circumstances of Evaluation: Is the Trade-off Always Innocuous?”, Synthese, vol. 184, no. 2, pp. 199–216.
Kneer, M., 2015, Perspective in Language, PhD thesis, EHESS.
Kneer, M., A. Vicente, and D. Zeman, 2017, “Relativism about Predicates of Personal Taste and Perspectival Plurality”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 37–60.
Kölbel, M., 2009, “The Evidence for Relativism”, Synthese, vol. 166, no. 2, pp. 375–394.
Kölbel, M., 2004a, “Faultless Disagreement”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 104, no. 1, pp. 53–73.
Kölbel, M., 2004b, “Indexical Relativism vs. Genuine Relativism”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 297–313. Lasersohn, P., 2016, Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kölbel, M., 2009, “Relative Truth, Speaker Commitment, and Control of Implicit Arguments”, Synthese, vol. 166, no. 2, pp. 359–374.
Kölbel, M., 2008, “Quantification and Perspective in Relativist Semantics”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 305–337.
Kölbel, M., 2005, “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 6, pp. 643–686.
Lewis, D., 1980, “Index, Context, and Content”, in S. Kanger and S. Ohman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 79–100.
Lewis, D., 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, vol. 88, pp. 513–543.
MacFarlane, J., 2014, Assessment-Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ninan, D., 2010, De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication, Philosophy Compass, vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 551–567.
Rabern, B., 2012, “Propositions and Multiple Indexing”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 116–124.
Rabern, B. and D. Ball, 2019, “Monsters and the Theoretical Role of Context”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XCVIII, no. 2, pp. 392–416.
Recanati, F., 2007, Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rey, D., 2016, In Defense of Implicit Times, PhD thesis, University of Barcelona http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/398833 [retrieved: 31/03/2019].
Richard, M., 2004, “Contextualism and Relativism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 119, no. 1–2, pp. 215–242.
Roeper, T., 2016, “Propositions and Implicit Arguments Carry a Default General Point of View. Acquisition Evidence against Relativism and Subjectivity”, in C. Meier and J. van Wijnbergen-Huitink (eds.), Subjective Meaning: Alternatives to Relativism, De Gruyter, Germany, pp. 210– 226.
Snyder, E., 2013, “Binding, Genericity, and Predicates of Personal Taste”, Inquiry, vol. 56, no. 2–3, pp. 278–306.
Stalnaker, R., 1981, “Indexical Belief”, Synthese, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 129– 149.
Stephenson, T., 2007, “Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predi- cates of Personal Taste”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 30, no. X, pp. 487–525.
Stojanovic, I., 2012, “The Problem of De Se Assertion”, Erkenntnis, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 49–58.
Torre, S., 2010, “Centered Assertion”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 150, no. x, pp. 97–114.
Vlach, F., 1973, “Now” and “Then”: A Formal Study in the Logic of Tense Anaphora, PhD thesis, UCLA.
Weber, C., 2013, “Centered Communication”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, supplement 1, pp. 205–223.
Zeman, D., 2018, “Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Index- ing”, in R. Truswell, C. Cummins, C. Heycock, B. Rabern and H. Rohde (eds.), https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DRjNjViN/Zeman.pdf Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21, vol. 2, pp. 1353–1370.
Zeman, D., 2015, “Relativism and Bound Predicates of Personal Taste: An Answer to Schaffer’s Argument from Binding”, Dialectica, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 155–183.
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