Is Underdetermination a Coherent Thesis?
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Abstract
The thesis of empirical underdetermination figures as one of the major contemporary challenges against scientific realism. Nevertheless, it has been frequently considered as a coherent challenge and a way to mitigate its impact has been sought by either weakening some realist position or attacking some of its most problematic premises. In the present essay, I defend an argument against it, namely, that it is a thesis that leads us to a reductio and that such a result defeats its alleged plausibility as an anti-realist thesis.
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García Martínez, L. M. (2019). Is Underdetermination a Coherent Thesis?. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 51(151), 35–63. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.02
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References
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Quine, W.V.O., 1975, “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World”, Erkenntnis, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 313–328.
Sklar, L., 1981, “Do Unborn Hypotheses Have Rights?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 17–29.
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Suppes, P., 1962, “Models of Data”, en E. Nagel, S. Patrick y T. Alfred (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.
Tal, E., 2016a, “Making Time: A Study in the Epistemology of Measure- ment”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 297–335.
Tal, E., 2016b, “How Does Measuring Generate Evidence? The Problem of Observational Grounding”, Journal of Physics, Conference Series 772.
Tal, E., 2015, Measurement in Science, https://plato.stanford.edu/ar- chives/fall2017/entries/measurement-science/ [fecha de consulta: 03/04/ 2018].
Tal, E., 2011, “How Accurate is the Standard Second?”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 78, no. 5, pp. 1082–1096.
Thomson, J.J., 1897, “Cathode Rays?”, Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, reimpreso en M. JoNye (ed.), 1986, The Question of the Atom, Tomash Publishers, Los Ángeles.
Woodward, J.F., 2011, “Data and Phenomena: a Restatement and Defense”, Synthese, vol. 182, no. 1, pp. 165–179.
Basu, P.K., 2003, “Theory-Ladenness of Evidence: A Case Study From History of Chemistry”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 351–368.
Bogen, J. y J. Woodward, 1988, “Saving the Phenomena”, Philosophical Review, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 303–352.
Bueno, O., 2016, “Epistemology and Philosophy of Science”, en H. Paul (comp.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Science, Oxford Uni- versity Press, Oxford.
Butterfield, J., 2014, “On Under-Determination in Cosmology”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 57–69.
Carrier, M., 1994, The Completeness of Scientific Theories on the Deri- vation of Empirical Indicators Within a Theoretical Framework: The Case of Physical Geometry, The University of Western Ontario Series of Philosophy of Science, Boston.
Chakravartty, A., 2017, Scientific Realism https://plato.stanford.edu/ar- chives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/ [fecha de consulta: 25/01/ 2019].
Chakravartty, A., 2016, “Case Studies, Selective Realism, and Historical Evidence”, en M. Massimi, J.-W. Romeign and G. Schurz, EPSA15 Selected Papers, Springer, 2017, pp. 13–23.
Churchland, P.M., 1985, “The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of Superempirical Virtues”, en P.M. Churchland y C.A. Hooker (comps.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Devitt, M., 1991, Realism and Truth, Princeton University Press, Prince-ton.
Ellis, G.F., 2014, “On the Philosophy of Cosmology”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 5–23.
Feyerabend, P., 1975, Against Method, New Left Books, Londres.
French, S., 2014, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
French, S. y M. Redhead, 1988, “Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 233–246.
Frigg, R. y S. Hartmann, 2018, Models in Science https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/models-science/ [fecha de consulta: 20/06/2018].
Grover, M., 1962, “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities”, en F.
Herbert y M. Grover (comps.), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Press.
Hacking, I., 1983, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hanson, 1958, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jones, R., 1991, “Realism about What?”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 185–202.
Kitcher, P., 1993, The Advancement of Science, Oxford University Press, Nueva York.
Kosso, P., 2010, “And Yet It Moves: The Observability of the Rotation of the Earth”, Foundations of Science, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 213–225.
Kuhn, T., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2a. ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kukla, A., 1996, “Does Every Theory Have Empirically Equivalent Ri- vals?”, Erkenntnis, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 137–166.
Kukla, A., 1993, “Laudan, Leplin, Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermi- nation”, Analysis, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 1–7.
Ladyman, J., 2002, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Routledge, Londres.
Ladyman, J., 2007, “Scientific Structuralism: On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a Structure”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 23–43.
Ladyman, J., 1998, “What is Structural Realism?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 409–424.
Ladyman, J., D. Ross, D. Spurrett y J. Collier, 2007, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lakatos, I., 1978, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Laudan, L., 1990, “Demystifying underdetermination”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, pp. 267–297.
Laudan, L., 1984, “Realism Without the Real”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 156–162.
Laudan, L. y J. Leplin, 1991, “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermina- tion”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 449–472.
Leplin, J., 1997, “The Underdetermination of Total Theories”, Erkenntnis, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 203–215.
Lewis, P.J., 2016, Quantum Ontology: A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford University Press, USA.
Lewis, P.J., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. Magnus, P.D. y C. Callender, 2004, “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 320–338.
Manchak, J., 2011, “What Is a Physically Reasonable Space-Time?”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 410–420.
Manchak, J., 2009, “Can We Know the Global Structure of Spacetime?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 53–56.
Musgrave, A., 1985, “Realism Versus Constructive Empiricism”, en P.M. Churchland y C.A. Hooker (comps.), Chicago and London: Images of Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Musgrave, A., 1974, “Logical Versus Historical Theories of Confirmation”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1–23.
Nagel, E., 1961, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, Brace & World, Harcourt.
Norton, J.D., 2008, “Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory”, en M. Carrier, D. Howard y J. Kouran (eds.), The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, pp. 1–31.
Okasha, S., 2002, “Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Dis- tinction, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 303–319.
Popper, Karl R., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge Classics, Londres.
Quine, W.V.O., 1992, Pursuit of Truth, Harvard University Press, Mass.
Quine, W.V.O., 1975, “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World”, Erkenntnis, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 313–328.
Sklar, L., 1981, “Do Unborn Hypotheses Have Rights?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 17–29.
Stanford, P.K., 2006, Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Stanford, P.K., 2001, “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermi- nation Should we Take Seriously?”, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 68, no. 3 pp. S1-S12.
Suppes, P., 1962, “Models of Data”, en E. Nagel, S. Patrick y T. Alfred (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.
Tal, E., 2016a, “Making Time: A Study in the Epistemology of Measure- ment”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 297–335.
Tal, E., 2016b, “How Does Measuring Generate Evidence? The Problem of Observational Grounding”, Journal of Physics, Conference Series 772.
Tal, E., 2015, Measurement in Science, https://plato.stanford.edu/ar- chives/fall2017/entries/measurement-science/ [fecha de consulta: 03/04/ 2018].
Tal, E., 2011, “How Accurate is the Standard Second?”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 78, no. 5, pp. 1082–1096.
Thomson, J.J., 1897, “Cathode Rays?”, Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, reimpreso en M. JoNye (ed.), 1986, The Question of the Atom, Tomash Publishers, Los Ángeles.
Woodward, J.F., 2011, “Data and Phenomena: a Restatement and Defense”, Synthese, vol. 182, no. 1, pp. 165–179.
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