Private Language Argument (II)

Abstract

(This is the second part of a survey paper on the “Private Language Argument” (PLA). The first part appeared in the previous issue of Crítica: vol. 7, no. 20, 1975, pp. 73-104.)

In the first part of this paper, the orthodox line of the PLA was pursued further. In this second part, another line of argumentation is introduced.

Strawson’s reconstruction of Kant’s objectivity arguments is presented as an argument having a similar objective as the PLA. Cartesian contents of consciousness cannot he identified or re-identified and thus there cannot be a language for them. These are pseudo-objects that keep their appearance of objects only because of an illegitimate trading with our public-notion of object.

Shoemaker’s argument against private similarities also keeps in view the same target as the PLA. Shoemaker claims that the notion of private similarities turns out to be circularly empty. As a result, there would be no kinds, no inductions, etc. These private objects would then keep their denomination only as a gracious gift.

Saunders & Henze have brought up the PLA in relation with the idea of a private Ego. If the notion of such an Ego cannot be introduced, the idea of a world and that of a language collapse. Hacker also likens the PLA, to a doctrine of Kant, according to which ‘experiences without concepts are blind’. Hacker ‘argues that the PLA indicates that there cannot be private concepts and, consequently, no private language.

Pears claims that there is a weak interpretation of the idea of a private language which is not obviously mistaken. He uses the sense-reference distinction in order to claim that in a private language the sense would be public whereas the reference would remain private. However, the question arises as to what extent the sense could be left indeterminate by the reference. It seems that under this hypothesis there would be nothing private in such a language.

Another interpretation of the PLA was introduced by R. Rhees. In contrast with that of Malcolm, Rhees does not rest his argument on notions like those of ‘rules’, ‘criteria’, etc. Rhees’ strategy is different, namely, he points to the use that Ayer’s Crusoe would like to give to notions like that of ‘giving meaning’ and observes that a number of other notions are lacking and because of that, Ayer’s Crusoe cannot introduce his ‘meaning’. Rhees advances his criticism in a persuasive manner; he would express himself in this way:

‘Look, naming brings such and such consequences in a language, why do you want to refer to names and language when none of these consequences follow?’

Castañeda has made an important observation concerning the PLA. He points out that the PLA goes against a strong essentialism assumed by the idea of a private language, according to which the private particulars are supposed to wear their own identity and their own names. The PLA, according to Castañeda, would oppose this view, adopting nominalism and an extreme conventionalism.

Rorty, under, the influence of Quine, has tried to rescue the PLA from the Wittgensteinians. First, he has rejected essentialist notions such as ‘senseless’ as necessary to attack the idea of immediacy —which is precisely what the PLA is against. Next, he has rejected the charge that the PLA has to assume verificationism; according to him, the PLA assumes rather a holistic view of reference.

Marks thinks that the notion of private language rests on the notion of a private object and this notion is empty since it is impossible to sort natural kinds out of these private objects. He qualifies his objection by saying that, so far, no private kinds seem available and it is up to the privatist to show that there could be private kinds. However, Marks feels confident he can show the illusory character of these kinds each time.

In the final remarks it is pointed out that the PLA remains questionable. It is still unclear as to what extent current philosophies and philosophers hold a view as extreme as that of private language; on the other hand, the task of bringing the PLA to take sides on central questions of Metaphysics of Persons and on current issues like the ‘Identity Thesis’ remains unaccomplished.

[Summary by Enrique Villanueva]