A Practical Justification of Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction

Abstract

The paper considers an Aristotelian argument to justify the principle of non contradiction given in Metaphysics 1008b 12-31. This is a practical argument, because it refers to human action and its explanation. First, the article outlines the argument, which is shown to be incomplete. Then, it analyses two fundamental assumptions of the argument: a) the explanation of actions; b) the rationality of actions. The first state that all actions can be explained by means of a desire and a relevant belief; the second, that all actions are rational. It affirms that there are Aristotelians grounds to support both assumptions, despite the existence of akrasía or incontinent action. Finally, it shows that the argument, with these two assumptions as additional premises, is complete and it has inductive plausibility.

[A.C.]