Los límites del yo: hacia una clarificación de la relación entre delirios de inserción de pensamiento y el principio de inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación
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Este artículo examina el debate acerca de si el delirio de inserción de pensamiento constituye un contraejemplo para el denominado principio de inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación. Luego de distinguir diferentes formulaciones del principio en la literatura, concluimos que el fenómeno delirante en cuestión no constituye un contraejemplo para el principio examinado. En la parte final se clarifica el concepto de autoadscripción psicológica y su uso relativo a los pronombres de primera persona en el contexto del debate acerca de la relación entre inserción de pensamiento e inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación.
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